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Chapter 1
Introduction
by Sissel Jensen
Firms will always try to sell additional units of output, but are also reluctant
to reduce the price of the units they are currently selling. There is always this
trade-off between expanding the market and keeping the price-cost margin. For
instance, a monopoly facing a downward sloping demand curve will expand the
market by lowering the price as long as the marginal revenue exceeds the marginal
cost. However, there are still some potential consumers who are willing to pay
more than the cost of producing an extra unit.
Consumers typically differ in their willingness to pay for an increment of a
firm's product. Two consumers will often have different willingness to pay for a
given amount of the good, due to differences in income, taste, etc, and will also
choose to buy different total quantities. Also, at a uniform price, because con-
sumers' valuation of successive units is declining, consumers buying many units
of the good enjoy consumer surpluses that are not captured by the firm. Both
observations indicate that alternative pricing policies can raise profits. All meth-
ods of price discrimination attempt to expand output at a lower price without
simultaneously offering all units at the same low price. If the firm can charge
different consumers a different unit price, or if the firm can offer different units
at a different price, it can increase profits. As to the second problem, the firm
can increase profits if it can appropriate consumer surplus by other means than
quoting a price per unit. For instance, the firm may announce a two-part tariff
which encourages consumers to make larger purchases via a low marginal price,
whereas the consumers' surpluses are captured via a fixed fee paid up-front.
The theoretical categorization of price discrimination is either as first, second,
or third-degree price discrimination.' First-degree, or perfect, price discrimina-
tion occurs if the price charged for each unit is equal to the maximum valuation
lSee Phlips (1983), Varian (1989), and Tirole (1988, chapter 3) for a general introduc-
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for that unit. If the firm had exact knowledge about each consumer's valuation
of the product,. it could make a single take-it-or-leave-it offer to each consumer
that appropriates the entire social surplus. Therefore, first-degree price discrim-
ination entails no efficiency loss compared to perfect competition, since perfect
competition maximizes social surplus (but it does affect the distribution of income
compared to perfect competition).
Under second-degree price discrimination, or nonlinear pricing, the price per
unit depends on the total number of units a consumer buys. A firm makes a
universal announcement of its pricing policy, accessible for all consumers, but
the tariff(s) may be designed so that a consumer's total expenditures do not
increase proportionately with the amount purchased. If two consumers buy dif-
ferent amounts, because they value the product differently, they are also paying
a different (average) price per unit.
Third-degree price discrimination refers to a situation where a firm charges
different groups of consumers a different unit price, but charges a linear tariff for
each group. Whether a consumer belongs to a certain group is determined on
the basis of some exogenous information so that the firm can enforce the division
easily, for instance age, occupation, sex, location, etc.
Perfect price discrimination is informationally extremely demanding and as-
sumes that a supplier can offer different contracts conditionally on a consumer's
"type", or willingness to pay. In practice, different contracts are offered condi-
tionally on observable variable, where the observables are assumed to serve as
imperfect estimates of a consumer's willingness to pay for the good. If the firm
can only gather imperfect estimates about different consumers' valuation of the
good, it cannot appropriate the entire surplus either. Second- and third-degree
price discrimination will therefore yield second-best allocations.
Price discrimination is not a viable strategy unless the firm has some market
power and hence, the ability to set price above marginal cost. In addition, it
must also have the ability to sort consumers and to prevent resale. As to resale,
consumers buying at a low price may resell the product to consumers facing a
high price and thereby demolish the firm's attempt to charge different prices.
However, resale may be difficult for consumers for several reasons, for instance;
resale can be illegal, resale can lead to loss of warranty, or consumers must incur
large transaction costs in order to resell the product (Carlton and Perloff, 1999).
That there are impediments to resale is also supported by the fact that we observe
price discrimination in so many markets.
Under third-degree price discrimination one assumes that a monopolist is able
to prevent resale between groups, but not in any sense within a group (and must
charge a uniform price). Under second-degree price discrimination one assumes
tion to price discrimination. For a comprehensive exposition of nonlinear pricing see Wilson
(1993). Pigou (1920) provides the foundation for the classification of the different forms of price
discrimination.
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that consumers are anonymous in every respect but in the size of their purchases.
There is only one single group in the above mentioned sense, but the monopolist
can prevent all attempts to resell the product. However, the firm can not neglect
the fact that consumers that have high willingness to pay have an incentive to
pretend that their valuation is low. Generally, preventing resale (in one sense or
another) is not regarded as a severe problem, whereas the problems associated
with sorting consumers with different willingness to pay can be tremendous.
The simplest problem of screening can be formulated by letting a monopoly
supply a single good to a group of consumers that are identical in all character-
istics but their marginal willingness to pay for the monopolists product. This is
the canonical model with single-dimensional private information and determinis-
tic participation in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984). The
models also adopt the assumption that the firm observes a single-dimensional
quantity (quality) variable, making quantity (quality) the only possible variable
for the firm to trade against payment. The models serve as benchmarks in the
literature on second-degree price discrimination.f
Sorting consumers becomes an increasingly difficult task to perform when the
screening problem is multi-dimensional, or when the firm faces competition, and
so far there are very few precise and robust predictions given in the literature.
Nevertheless, these are important topics on the research agenda.
1.1 A brief review of the literature
Nonlinear pricing is a standard topic within the economic theory of the firm
which is described in all textbooks in microeconomics. Although the way firms
implement nonlinear pricing varies substantially, nonlinear pricing is practiced
in many industries." Nonlinear pricing provides an efficient means of meeting a
firm's revenue requirement, be it a regulated firm with the need to recover fixed
costs or a profit maximizing monopoly, when compared to a uniform pricing
regime. If the population of consumers is diverse, it is well established that the
optimal tariff is generally nonlinear (whenever this is viable).
Let me just start with a situation where a monopoly offers a single two-part
tariff to all consumers. The firm charges consumers a lump-sum fee for the right
2In Mussa and Rosen (1978) consumers have unit-demand and the product can be sold
with different qualities, while in Maskin and Riley (1984) consumers purchase many units of a
single-dimensionalgood. The two papers predict qualitatively identical results.
3There is a vast literature on nonlinear pricing and I do not intend to give anything close to
a survey here. I will, however, try to sketch some of the main topics within the field together
with the most important references. The bibliography section in Wilson (1993) provides a
comprehensive list of references to the literature on nonlinear pricing together with a summary
of the theoretical development. He also directs the reader to extensive bibliographies on the
various subtopics of price discrimination. Rochet and Stole (2000) give a comprehensivesurvey
of the literature on multidimensional screening.
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to purchase goods and a uniform price per unit. Assuming that the demand side
is described by.a single representative consumer, a two-part pricing arrangement
is equivalent to perfect price discrimination, which maximizes monopoly profits
by appropriating all consumer surplus. This was pointed out in the classical
articles by Oi (1971). In a market of many different consumers, the global profit
maximum can be reached by offering equally many two-part tariffs with the price
per unit equal to marginal cost and the lump-sum fees equal to each individual's
surplus. If such discriminatory pricing is not within the firm's power, because
it is not able to identify each individual's taste, or because making exclusive
offers only to some consumers is unlawful, it will most likelyoffer a uniform two-
part tariff with a unit price above marginal cost and a fixed fee that extracts
all surplus from the consumer with the lowest willingness to pay. Later works
on uniform two-part tariffs in a monopoly context include studies with nonzero
income effects and with consumption externalities (see Schmalensee (1981), Ng
and Weisser (1974), Wilson (1993, chapter 7) and Littlechild (1975) and the
references therein).
Generally, let the demand side heterogeneity be captured in a single para-
meter which describes a consumer's intensity in the demand for the monopolist's
product (it can reflect differences in taste, or in income, or simply represent an
aggregate type parameter). If the demand of the different consumers can be
ordered for each price and the ordering is preserved for any price, the firm profits
when it designs equally many two-part tariffs as the number of consumers and
lets all consumers choose from the "tariff menu", ((AI, PI), (A2, P2), ... , (An, Pn)).
Since high demand consumers have the option to choose tariffs intended for low
demand consumers, the profitability on high demand consumers is restricted by
the relatively lower willingness to pay by low demand consumers. The firm designs
its pricing structure to maximize profits subject to a self-selection constraint.
(See for instance Goldman, Leland and Sibley (1984) and Wilson (1993, chapter
6). Sharkey and Sibley (1993) describe the properties of the optimal two-part
tariffs chosen by a regulator when the welfare of different consumers has different
weights.)
A menu of n different two-part tariffs mimics a single piecewise-linear n-part
tariff, a block-declining price schedule with a fixed fee and n - 1 unit prices
(Wilson, 1993, chapter 6.3 and 6.4).4 In the limit, with a continuum of types,
a multipart tariff tends towards a fully nonlinear tariff with complete separation
of types. Both approaches implement the allocation in Maskin and Riley (1984).
The results in the case of a single characteristic and a single instrument are
qualified by taking the assumption that only the local downward incentive com-
patibility constraint is binding. Hence, it suffices to ensure that a certain con-
4This is only true, however, when consumers have perfect knowledge about their future
demand, or when they can commit to future levels of consumption. Individual stochastic
demands break the duality between consumption and choice of the corresponding self-selecting
tariff, see Miravete (2000).
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sumer will not mimic an adjacent type below his own type. When consumers'
participation is deterministic, one can compute each consumer's expected surplus
as a function of the allocation of goods, and maximize the firm's profit net of this
expected surplus." Whenever the need to secure incentive compatibility does
not conflict with the need to ensure voluntary participation, complete separation
between different types can be reached, otherwise it may be optimal to exclude
some consumers or to offer different types identical contracts (ironing, pooling,
bunching). Rochet and Chane (1998) and Armstrong and Rochet (1999) explore
whether these results can be extended to multidimensional contexts, with several
characteristics and several instruments, and show what will be the likely proper-
ties of the optimum. Rochet and Stole (1999) and Armstrong and Vickers (1999)
relax the assumption that the reservation utility is perfectly known by the firm
and introduce stochastic participation. Multiple dimensions are difficult to han-
dle, partly because the incentive compatibility conditions are frequently not only
binding among local types. Discrete models with fewer incentive compatibility
constraints can, on the other hand, be tractable. Rochet and Stole (2000) give a
survey of the literature on multidimensional screening.
While keeping the assumptions that the private information concerns a single
variable, that the single crossing condition is satisfied and that the reservation
utility is independent of a consumer's type, other extensions of the bench-mark
models are to introduce more than one instrument or more than one observable
variable." An example within the first class is Matthews and Moore (1987),
examples within the second class are Sappington (1983) and Caillaud, Guesnerie,
Rey and Tirole (1988).7 The latter framework generalizes the standard results
with a single observable, whereas these are not necessarily found in the former.
Especially, as in Matthews and Moore (1987), nonlocal incentive constraints may
be binding.
In terms of economic applications, modelling imperfect competition between
firms competing with nonlinear price schedules, is of great importance. It is,
however, also very complicated. Among other factors, competitive models may
naturally suggest at least two dimensions of heterogeneity, including uncertain
participation (see section 7 in Rochet and Stole (2000), Rochet and Stole (1999),
and Armstrong and Vickers (1999)). The hypothesis that firms practice nonlinear
5participation is deterministic when the firm knows for certain that all consumers obtaining a
nonnegative surplus will buy the good, i.e., consumers' reservation utility is perfect information
to the firm. Especially, the reference models assume that the reservation utility is independent
of a consumer's type. Under the single crossing condition global incentive compatibility reduces
to the monotonicity condition.
6The approach of multidimensional types and a single instrument is done in Laffont, Maskin
and Rochet (1987).
7Matthews and Moore (1987) extend the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model by allowing the
monopolist to offer different levels of warranties as well as qualities. Sappington (1983) extends
the Baron and Myerson (1982) model of incentive regulation by letting the regulated firm
produce two instead of just one product.
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pricing is supported by many real-life examples, see for instance Wilson (1993)
and Michell and Vogelsang (1991). Also, the notion that oligopoly firms, one
way or another, are implementing an outlay schedule with quantity discounts
included, is also supported by Ivaldi and Martimort (1994).
Although we assume that all demand side heterogeneity is single dimensional,
modelling strategic interaction into models with nonlinear pricing is not straight-
forward. In the simplest case with full information and N identical consumer,
a monopoly would achieve perfect price discrimination by charging a two-part
tariff (Oi, 1971). In a duopoly, however, the competing firm can always charge a
uniform price that is preferred by all consumers and make nonnegative profit."
Similarly to the strive at solving the uniform price Bertrand paradox, there are
ways of getting round the similar problems of a nonuniform Bertrand equilibrium,
(examples are given in Mandy (1992) and in Harrison and Kline (2001)). Even so,
it may be necessary to add additional structure and restrictions to the models as
compared to the uniform pricing case. For instance, adding capacity constraints
will not alone solve the puzzle. Oren, Smith and Wilson (1983) model a case where
firms compete in market shares and use nonlinear tariffs in an attempt to separate
consumers with different willingness to pay. They find equilibria that resemble
monopoly pricing as well as equilibria with aspects of the standard Cournot
model. Harrison and Kline (2001) examine two-part tariffs in a Cournot oligopoly
with homogeneous consumers (full information). In addition to committing to a
capacity level at stage one, they assume that firms can commit to a fixed fee as
well. According to their findings, the unit price is equal to marginal price, and
the fixed fee mayor may not extract all consumer surplus. Stole (1995) finds
a separating screening equilibrium in an oligopoly with differentiated products
and single-dimensional uncertainty. This is the model that is extended to a
multidimensional context in Rochet and Stole (1999).
1.2 Outline of the thesis
The thesis consists of four essays on second-degree price discrimination. Firms
operating in a market are supposed to announce a set of tariffs, it may be a single
tariff or several tariffs. A tariff is to be understood as an announcement made by
a firm describing their services and the payments to be charged for such services.
In all four essays, the basic description of the demand side is that it consists
of heterogeneous consumers deriving utility from consuming multiple units of a
generic good q.9 A firm faces equally many downward-sloping demand curves
and each individual obtains a surplus at a uniform price. Firms are assumed to
8See, for instance, Gasmi, Moreaux and Sharkey (2000).
9By multiple units we mean that consumers buy so many units that q is continuous rather
than discrete. Hence, we do not treat the special case of unit demand, where one unit will be
demanded by a consumer if the price is less than or equal to his reservation price.
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have knowledge about the position of these demand curves, the intercept, the
slope, and other relevant information. A firm does not, however, know which
demand curve to associate with a given consumer. In all cases it is assumed that
consumers have quasilinear utility. Thus, the Marshallian consumer surplus is
an appropriate measure of individual welfare and this can also be measured in
monetary terms. Obviously, it is this value firms want to capture via a fixed fee.
In all models that are presented, the decision makers are private and un-
regulated firms and the objective is always to maximize profits. Since we are
using quasilinear utility, we do not regard how the firms' pricing affects differ-
ent consumers' incomes and how this in turn might affect social welfare. Both
first degree price discrimination and perfect competition produce efficient levels
of output and the outcome cannot be ranked in a Pareto sense. From a welfare
point of view then, the closer the pricing policy is to perfect price discrimination
the more likely it is that the price discrimination leads to a more efficient out-
come as compared to uniform pricing. However, a firm's pricing policy can lead
to inefficiencies in different ways; when price exceeds marginal costs and output
is restricted; when consumers have different marginal willingness to pay there
are unexploited gains from further trade; and when firms or consumers spend
resources that are of no benefit to any other party. Some of the models that are
considered in this thesis produce effects related to all three sources and, hence,
the net effect may be ambiguous.
The basic description of consumers' preferences is the same in all four essays.
The two first essays analyze second-degree price discrimination in a simple two-
type monopoly context (chapters 2 and 3). In the quantity framework with
nonlinear pricing, the quantity variable is typically single dimensional. Hence,
what is left to describe in the tariff is the payments to be charged for usage. The
payment can, however, be a nonlinear function of usage, and the firm can offer
several tariffs as well. If the quantity variable can be assigned a set of observable
attributes, services assigned one set of attributes can be charged differently than
services assigned another set of attributes. Hence, the part of the tariff describing
the service becomes an important issue for the firm. In the first paper, in chapter
2, the monopoly is allowed to "damage" the portion of its product that is sold to
low demand consumers. However, in this paper the firm must take the description
of the damaged service as given. In the second paper, in chapter 3, we assume that
the firm can observe each consumer's "mode of usage" as well as the individual
purchase size. Hence, the firm is free to design the attribute dimension, as well
as the payments to be charged.
The remaining two essays return to the case where the quantity variable is
single dimensional and we consider second-degree price discrimination in a context
with competition. Hence, the tariff is again a description of the payment to
be charged for usage. Chapter 4 is concerned with how the optimal quantity-
payment allocation can be truthfully implemented by optional piecewise linear
tariffs in a differentiated goods duopoly. In the last essay, presented in chapter
7
5, we analyze firms' possibility to use a two-part tariff in a homogeneous goods
oligopoly.
Chapter 2: Damaging Network Subscription
In the first paper we consider a monopoly model with heterogeneous consumer
characteristics along both a quantity and a quality dimension. We examine the
effects on the firm and consumers of introducing quality discrimination in a two-
type model with quantity discounts. It is assumed that the monopoly can sell
its product in two "versions", for instance a high-quality and a low quality ver-
sion. By accepting certain restrictions in the use of the service, individuals are
granted a reduction in the usage price. Even though producing low quality is
at least as costly as producing high quality, and can be described as a practice
of "damaging" , it may be profitable. Either because it enables the firm to serve
consumers it would otherwise exclude, or because it enables the firm to reduce
the informational rent to consumers having the largest willingness to pay for the
high-quality version.
We identify the private incentives to introduce a damaged version in the cases
where the monopoly excludes and serves, respectively, the type with low will-
ingness to pay. When the incentive behind damaging is to serve consumers that
absent damaging would not be served, damaging enables the firm to extract rent
from low demand types. Damaging will in this case lead to a Pareto-improvement.
However, the firm might also want to introduce damaging because it enables the
firm to reduce the information rent to high demand types, and thus, extract
larger surplus from these consumers. With damaging, the firm will reduce the
mark-up in the usage price towards low demand types, but the firm will also
spend resources that are of no benefit to any of the consumer groups. Hence, the
net welfare effects are ambiguous.
The model is closely related to Deneckere and McAfee (1996). They analyze
damaging in a framework of uniform pricing, and show that the practice can lead
to a Pareto-improvement. However, since nonlinear pricing has welfare effects
that are different from the welfare effects under linear pricing, the consequences
of damaging are also different in our model compared to Deneckere and McAfee
(1996).
In the paper, we also give illustrations on the practice of damaging in telecom-
munications. The first illustration is optional calling tariffs that place an artificial
restriction on consumers' call distribution. These are known as Calling circle tar-
iffs or Friends and Family tariffs, in which a quality reduction is achieved by
restricting the number of call termination points, i.e., phone numbers that can
be reached by the tariff. The second illustration is specific calling plans in the
cellular market that place a restriction on the consumer's mobility. By paying an
additional monthly fee, mobile phone subscribers pay a lower usage price when
the mobile phone is used from the subscriber's "home zone", which is the area
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inside or near the home, than when it is used from outside the home zone. In this
tariff, the quality .reduction is achieved by placing a restriction on the possible
points of call origination.
Chapter 3: Two-Part Tariffswith Partial Unbundling
The second paper also explores second degree price discrimination in a multi-
dimensional good context. It is assumed that the firm is able to monitor con-
sumers' use of the service, not just only the number of units but also consumers'
mode of usage measured according to some observable service attributes. For
instance, if we think of the generic good as telephony usage, i.e., the quantity
variable being call minutes, the firm can assign each minute a unique list of ob-
servable attributes, such as time-of-day, day-of-week, call termination point (the
phone number of the party being called), etc. Hence, we assume that it is possible
for the firm to monitor each consumer's calling pattern.
Even though a consumer's willingness to pay is private information, his call-
ing pattern can be observed by the firm. Hence, consumers having different
calling patterns can be charged according to different schedules. In the present
framework it is assumed that the demand side consists of two consumers, one is
a low demand type, and one is a high demand type. The low demand type is
assumed to have a concentrated calling pattern while the high demand type has
a dispersed calling pattern. As in the traditional models of single dimensional
screening, the contract meant for low types is distorted precisely in order to make
it less attractive to high type consumers. The present context is similar to a mul-
tiproduct context since units assigned different sets of attributes can be treated
as different products and the practice that is described refers to a situation with
partial unbundling. If the heterogeneity in consumers' calling pattern is ignored,
complete bundling occurs.
In models where the contract is two-dimensional, the single crossing condition
is ensured when high demand types have larger marginal willingness to pay for
all increments. If we impose any restriction on the mode of usage we must ensure
that this property still holds. If the high demand type's contract is not distorted
in any dimension, it is sufficient that the restriction has a nonpositive effect on
the consumer's marginal willingness to pay.
The paper shows that the firm introduces distortions in the use of the service
against a decrease in the quantity distortions in the low-type's contract. This may
not come as a surprise; when the firm has two instruments at hand it will distort
the contract in both relevant dimensions. If the heterogeneity on the demand
side is large, and price-cost distortions are the sole instrument at hand, then it
is also the case that a large fraction of the consumers pay a price well above
marginal cost, and the welfare losses arising from this may be severe. Hence,
any strategy that "increases the observability" of consumers' willingness to pay
may potentially increase both profit and welfare. This feature of the contract has
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analogous insight from theories on taxation. It is often optimal to use many, but
smaller tax rates, because deadweight losses are convex functions of the tax rate.
Chapter 4: Three-Part Tariffs in a Duopoly
Nonlinear pricing plays an important role in competitive markets. Likewise, we
can also observe that more sophisticated tariffs are replacing two-part tariffs. Es-
pecially, we often observe tariffs where the fixed monthly payment includes some
"free" consumption allowance per month. In effect, firms are using three-part tar-
iffs in addition to two-part tariffs to implement a nonlinear outlay schedule. One
approach of the third paper is to study how nonlinear pricing can be implemented
in:a competitive market.
The model is based on Stole (1995), which shows how a duopoly can reach
complete separation oftypes via direct mechanisms (take-it-or-leave-it contracts).
Stole (1995) shows that the qualitative properties of the monopoly model are
kept, that is, quantity purchases are downward distorted for all types but the one
that values the service highest. Later works on competitive price discrimination
in a similar setting, especially Armstrong and Vickers (1999) and Rochet and
Stole (1999), consider a setting with multi-dimensional uncertainty. They find
that many of the results achieved in the monopoly setting does not extend to
a competitive framework. However, the model presented in chapter 4 maintains
a setting with single dimensional uncertainty, as in Stole (1995). Especially,
consumers choice with respect to participation can be treated as a deterministic
decision. If the utility a consumer derives when he accepts one of the firms'
tariffs weakly exceeds the utility he derives when he rejects it, the firm knows
with certainty that the consumer will participate.
As a consequence of the existence of a competing firm, consumers considering
one of the firm's tariffs have the option of accepting the competing firm's tariff.
The outside option will of course be of higher value for high demand types than for
low demand types, and the reservation utility is therefore an increasing function
of consumers' type. Consequently, it is no longer sufficient to ensure that the
individual rationality constraint binds for the worst type only, as in the monopoly
version. The participation constraint might turn out to be binding for several
types. If the two firms are not local monopolies, the participation constraint will
bind in an interval in the lower end of the type-space.
Although product differentiation enables the firms to implement price discrim-
ination, it is shown that competition has important effects on the tariff structure.
In the monopoly case, the increasing hazard rate assumption is sufficient to ensure
that the outlay schedule is implementable in two-part tariffs. The hazard rate
assumption is important because it affects the quantity profile. In the present
model, when the participation constraint binds it determines the quantity profile
and, hence, the increasing hazard rate condition is no longer sufficient. Although
it is difficult to prove, the model seems to suggest that a fully separating equi-
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librium can only be reached if the firms are allowed to use three-part tariffs in
addition to two-part tariffs.
Chapter 5: Two-Part Tariffs, Consumer Heterogeneity, and Cournot
Competition
In the last paper we assume that firms competing in an oligopoly sell a homo-
geneous good in a market with heterogenous demand. As mentioned, extending
models of nonlinear pricing to a context with competition is not trivial. The
paper by Harrison and Kline (2001) explores competition with two-part tariffs in
a strategic oligopoly setting. They extend the basic problem of charging a group
of N identical consumers according to a two-part tariff instead of a uniform unit
price, i.e., they extend the first part of the model in Oi (1971) to oligopoly. An
important property of their model is the assumption that firms commit to a fixed
fee in addition to capacity. Without this assumption it is not possible to es-
cape a situation where a competing firm charges a uniform price and captures all
consumers.
A natural extension of Harrison and Kline (2001) is to introduce demand side
heterogeneity. Equivalently, this is to extend the second part of Oi (1971) to a
competitive context.!" In the model presented in chapter 5, we extend Harrison
and Kline (2001) to a oligopoly context with two groups of consumers having
different willingness to pay for the good firms are marketing. Apart from this,
we keep all their assumptions apart from that. In the Harrison and Kline model,
when the firms are able to commit to a fixed fee, the properties of the outcome are
a modification of the monopoly model only with respect to the fixed fee. When
we extend the model to include demand side heterogeneity, the properties of the
monopoly model are modified in several other respects. The paper demonstrates
that an extension from one consumer type to two types is quite different in a
monopoly and in an oligopoly. A monopolist can discipline its conduct vis-å-vis
the two consumer group, while a firm competing in an oligopoly in incapable of
instructing other firms' pricing and the firms commit to a quantity, which they
will sell in any case.
In the paper we show that the main results in Harrison and Kline (2001) are
reversed when the model is extended from one to two types of consumers. In
particular, we find that the unit price can exceed marginal costs, and that the
fixed fee can be below fixed costs. As in the monopoly model, large demand side
heterogeneity results in higher unit price, in order to extract surplus from high
demand consumers. Then, the access fee is low even in a monopoly setting and
competed away in a duopoly. We also show that two-part tariffs may collapse,
10An extension of this model again, would be models with competitive screening. However,
as pointed out before, this involves large difficulties and is kept outside the scope of the present
model.
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because each firm would rather commit to a traditional Cournot price system
with zero fixed fee.
Finally, numerical examples illustrate that both firms serving both types of
consumers can be an equilibrium outcome in duopoly, in cases where a monopolist
would serve only one type of consumers. The examples also demonstrate that
there can be multiple equilibria.
12
Chapter 2
Damaging Network Subscription
by Øystein Foros, Sissel Jensen and Jan Yngve Sand*
2.1 Introduction
Nonlinear pricing, giving high demand consumers quantity discounts, is a well-
known practice in the telecommunications market. From both a normative and
a positive point of view it may be desirable to use the demand heterogeneity to
achieve price discrimination. If consumers' preferences were perfectly known, the
firm would simply offer a set of take-it-or-leave-it contracts depending directly
on the taste of individual consumers. The different contracts would typically
specify an amount to be paid by the consumers to the firm and a quantity level
to be provided by the firm. The levels would be set so that the firm would ex-
tract the entire social surplus from producing the good. However, the presence
of asymmetric information forces the firm to offer contracts depending purelyon
observable variables, which prevents it from extracting the entire surplus from
every consumer. The seminal paper by Mussa and Rosen (1978) shows that a
monopolyenlarges the quality spectrum to separate consumers that value qual-
ity differently.!' When the firm has incomplete information about consumers'
willingness to pay for quality, a quality reduction towards consumers with low
·We are indebted to Bjørn Hansen, Marit Hareland, Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, Petter Os-
mundsen, Patrick Rey, Lars Sørgard, Jon Vislie, participants at the 10th Summer Schoolof the
EEA in Toulouse (September 1999), as well as to an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
The paper is a revised version of Foros, Jensen and Sand (1999). An earlier draft was pre-
sented at the June 1998 conference of the ITS (International Telecommunications Society) in
Stockholm and at the 25th annual E.A.R.I.E. conference (European Association for Research
in Industrial Economics) in Copenhagen in August 1998.
llThis was captured early by Dupuit (1849). Ekelund (1970) gives an overview of Dupuit's
contribution to the understanding of the practice of price discrimination.
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willingness to pay is used to induce self-selection. Similarly, an enlargement of the
quantity spectrum can be used to separate consumers that value equal quantities
of the service differently.P
The question we ask in this paper is whether it may be profitable for a firm
to use the heterogeneity on the consumer side with respect to calling pattern (or
in more general terms the customers' use of the service) as an additional sorting
device to quantity. We set up a model which allows us to examine the effects
of introducing "quality discrimination" in a two type model with quantity dis-
counts. The objective is to show that a monopoly that has verifiable information
that is correlated with the consumer's type can gain a profit that is at least as
large as what would have been achieved if he was able to design contracts that
depend not only on quantity purchase, but also on a second observable vari-
able. Hence, the variable being contracted upon may have two dimensions or
attributes. We will focus on the telecommunications market when we think in
terms of application of our model, and the observable variables will be thought
of as a consumer's quantity purchase and his calling pattern. We will interpret
the second variable as a quality variable and use the terms high and low qual-
ity, although it may be argued that this sometimes will represent a slight abuse
of terminology. Throughout the paper, we will assume that the firm knows for
certain what kind of calling pattern (quality) some given consumer (some given
quantity type consumer) prefers and that each consumer has distinct different
preferences over calling patterns. Examples of individual calling patterns are call
dispersion i.e., how many different subscribers a consumer makes calls to, and
time-of-use, i.e., daytime calling, evening-jnighttime calling.P
Telecom companies have traditionally provided consumers with perfect in-
terconnectivity through a "fully featured" network subscription, i.e., with the
possibility to communicate with any other member of the network. However,
consumers' willingness to pay for different call termination points differs. Res-
idential consumers most often pick up the phone to call a friend or a family
member. On the other hand, a given business call could be terminating virtually
anywhere, just think of a call from a phone marketing company. In addition, it
is reasonable to believe that a business customer has a higher willingness to pay
for a given quantity of the service compared to a residential consumer.
We start with the familiar model of second-degree price discrimination, pre-
12Maskinand Riley (1984) show that discrimination along a single dimension in quantity is
very similar to discrimination along a single dimension in quality. They also show that the
results in Mussa and Rosen (1978) apply to more general utility functions.
13Although calling pattern is ex ante private information, the firm is able to reveal any
possible correlation between a consumer's quantity purchase and for example call dispersion
by analyzing the customer's call records. We will assume that the two factors are positively
correlated and that the problem can be reduced to a type-space that is single-dimensional. In
particular, we shall assume that a consumerwith lowwillingnessto pay for quantity makes calls
to a small number of subscribers, while a consumer with high willingness to pay for quantity
makes calls to a large number of subscribers.
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sented as a two-type case where the monopoly uses quantity as the single sort-
ing device (following Tirole (1988) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), based on
Maskin and Riley (1984)). Consumers have either high or low willingness to pay
for some given quantity level of the service, and a consumer's willingness to pay
for the monopoly's product is private informatlon.l" In the two-type case, the
firm might find it optimal to exclude low quantity types in order to reduce the
information rent to the high-quantity types. Next, we expand the model and al-
low for consumer heterogeneity along a second dimension. This dimension takes
into account that the service can be sold with different quality attributes, or on
different terms.P In our context, the interpretation of quality differences is a
possible restriction on consumers' calling pattern, for example a restriction on
the distribution of a consumer's outgoing calls.
It may be argued that the firm's way of introducing quality differences follows
the notion of damaging. In fact, we will use damaging as a notation when the
firm conditions a contract on the use of the service. Damaging occurs when a
producer who initially offers a high quality product creates a low quality product
by reducing the quality of his initial product. Deneckere and McAfee (1996)
analyze damaging in a framework of uniform pricing and with the presence of two
consumer types having high or low willingness to pay for some given quality.!"
In such a framework low demand consumers might remain unserved when the
firm offers only the high quality version. The assumption that the low demand
segment is not served in the absence of the low quality product is crucial in the
Deneckere and McAfee article. With the introduction of a low quality version,
low demand types gain a positive utility since the demand function decreases in
price. In addition, the firm may be forced to reduce the price of the high-quality
good in order to deter consumers in this segment from buying the inferior good
(the incentive constraint is binding).
In many markets where damaging occurs, it seems relevant to argue that
linear pricing is an artificial restriction on the firm's pricing strategy. For that
14An alternative formulation is that the firm has complete information, but operates subject
to a regulation saying that consumers can choose among all contracts offered by the firm. In
other words, the firm cannot offer a take-it-or-leave-it contract exclusively to each consumer
type.
15SeeLaffont and Tirole (1993, part 4.2.2) for a treatment of a regulation problem with mul-
tidimensional informational asymmetry, but where the unknown parameters enter the relevant
functions through linear combinations. Introduction of a second type-dimension complicates
the analysis considerably because the first-order conditions for consumers' maximization (in-
centive compatibility) can be difficult to incorporate as constraints in the firm's optimization
problem, see Laffont et al. (1987), Rochet and Chene (1998), Armstrong and Rochet (1999),
Wilson (1993).
16They also analyze a second case where the consumers' reservation price for high and low
quality varies according to a continuous type parameter. They refer to the two different cases
as "the dual use" case and "the single use" case. Basically, this gives the same conclusions
about damaging leading to a Pareto improvement, but the conditions are more stringent and
harder to arrive at with a continuous type parameter.
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reason we let the monopoly firm charge nonlinear prices and search for the profit
maximizing allocations in fully nonlinear take-it-or-leave-it contracts. This af-
fects several aspects of the model in Deneckere and McAfee (1996). First, the
likelihood of low demand consumers being served increases when the firm prac-
tices nonlinear pricing. Nevertheless, even if low demand consumers are served
absent damaging the firm still has an incentive to reduce the quality towards
low demand consumers. Hence, we can relax the crucial assumption about low
demand consumers being unserved absent damaging. We show that the incentive
to practice damaging is qualitatively different when low demand consumers are
served absent damaging and when they are not. Secondly, since nonlinear pric-
ing has welfare effects that are very different from the welfare effects under linear
pricing, the consequences of damaging are also different in our model compared
to Deneckere and McAfee.
Henriet, Henry, Rey and Rochet (1988) discuss an issue similar to the one we
analyze. They examine the effects of discrimination with respect to price and
the variety of the products offered in a model with unit demand. One of their
main tasks is to examine the welfare effects of creating artificial differences in the
characteristics of the product. They set up a model with variable quality and with
production costs independent of quality, where consumers prefer a higher quality.
They show that a welfare-maximizing monopoly would want to discriminate,
whereas a profit-maximizing monopoly would not. Their results underline the fact
that discriminating policies are not necessarily a result driven by profit concerns.
The model we present is an example of the fact that increased observability
enhances the principals' ability to separate the different consumer types, as shown
in Holmstrom (1979). A firm may find it profitable to make investments that en-
ables it to reveal some information about a consumer's type, and subsequently
use this information in the contract. Although in most situations a perfect esti-
mation of a consumers' type is either impossible or prohibitively costly, imperfect
estimation can improve profits - additional information is always of value to the
firm because it allows a less costly separation of types. The profit a firm can
gain by using two kinds of screening variables is at least as large as if it chooses
not to use one of them. In our telecom example, the screening mechanisms are
to monitor consumers' quantity purchase and calling pattern. Matthews and
Moore (1987) address the screening problem in a context where consumers have
one characteristic but where the monopoly can use several instruments. They
consider a model where a good can be sold with different attributes (quality and
warranty), where consumers vary in their evaluation of these attributes, and de-
velop a technique for dealing with incentive compatibility between nonadjacent
types. However, this matter is simplified in our model since we are dealing with
two types only, so nonadjacent types do not exist.
In section 2 we present a simple modelon damaging relevant for the telecom-
munications market. Suppose a monopoly selling the high quality product chooses
to serve the high demand consumers only. When quality is introduced as an ad-
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ditional sorting device, the firm may find it in its own interest to serve the low
demand types. If .so, the firm damages the version to extract rent from low de-
mand consumers. Furthermore, nonlinear pricing creates an additional incentive
to practice damaging. The firm can reduce the information rent achieved by high
demand consumers if low demand consumers are offered a low quality product
instead of a high quality product. The reason is that damaging reduces high
demand consumers' incentive to mimic a low demand consumer.
Section 3 of this paper illustrates two examples of damaging in the telecom-
munications market. One example that fits the model is a set of specific optional
calling plans, familiar to most people as Friends and Family tariffs. By accepting
a restriction on the number of call termination points, a residential consumer
could gain about the same discount as a large business customer. On the other
hand, the restriction on call distribution implies that Friends and Family tariffs
are less attractive to the business segment than they are to private subscribers.F
Another example is a practice known in the cellular market. Firms operating the
DCS1800-technology have started to offer an optional calling plan denoted as a
home zone tariff. By accepting a restriction on mobility, a consumer can call at a
discounted rate. This enables the firm to compete with the fixed link technology.
On the other hand, the restriction on mobility implies that the home zone tariff
is less attractive to the segments that value mobility very highly. Finally, section
4 summaries the main conclusions.
2.2 A model with Damaging
Implementation of price discrimination requires that the seller has some degree of
monopoly power and that resale possibilities are limited or absent. For simplic-
ity, we assume that the firm is a monopoly and that resale markets are absent.
Hence, the monopoly simply offers take-it-or-leave-it contracts to the consumers
without engaging in any negotiation with them. If the monopoly has complete
information, it can discriminate perfectly and thus extract all surplus. However,
we assume that the monopoly faces an information constraint and perfect price
discrimination is then ruled out. The monopoly cannot tell consumers apart and
this introduces the "self-selection" or "incentive-compatibility" constraint in the
problem.
There are two types of consumers, type 1 in proportion Al and type 2 in
proportion (1 - A1). Type 2 always has a higher marginal willingness to pay
17Friends and Family tariffs are usually seen as a mechanism for creating lock-in effects in
the competition between network operators, see for instance Michell and Vogelsang (1991),196.
Once a subscriber's "community of interest" is subscribers of the same network, a calling circle
tariff also creates switching costs. More generally, when a firm charges different prices for calls
terminating on a subscriber's network than for those terminating on a rival's network it gives
rise to network externalities. Such a pricing strategy is recently studied in Laffont, Rey and
Tirole (1998).
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for outgoing calls than type 1. Thus, outgoing calls are an increasing function of
type. The monopoly can produce two vertically differentiated products, a product
with high (H) and a product with low (L) quality. The number of possible call
termination points represents the quality level of the products. With H one can
reach the entire network and with L only a small fraction, the quality level of
L is exogenous (i.e., the number of other subscribers one can reach with the L
product). Furthermore, we assume that the consumer types differ in their use of
the network subscription, i.e., calling pattern. The two types could be thought
of as two distinct market segments. If we think of a type 1 consumer as a private
customer he will have a relatively low willingness to pay for the possibility to
make outgoing calls to the total network. If we think of a type 2 consumer as a
business customer, like a phone marketing company, he will necessarily demand
the possibility to call every subscriber in the network. We make the following
assumption about the differences in calling patterns: type 1 consumers make calls
to a small fraction of the network, whereas type 2 consumers make calls to the
majority of the network. This implies that a type 2 consumer values high quality
more than does a type 1 consumer and consumers' utility depends on the quantity
purchased and the quality of the service. The assumptions on calling patterns
are realistic if the business consumer is a phone marketing company. However,
if the business consumer is a cab company or a pizza parlor the assumptions on
calling patterns is violated.
To focus on price discrimination we have chosen to abstract from network
externalities.l" The following assumptions eliminate both the access and the call
externalities.
1. The network has N subscribers, N being fixed and exogenous. This assump-
tion allows us to ignore the interdependencies between the pricing problem
and the network size, i.e., the access externality. Even if type 1 consumers
are excluded from making outgoing calls, or buying the low quality product,
other consumers in the network can call them. This is equivalent to saying
that all consumers have paid the one-time installation fee and the monthly
fee for the basic service.
2. Both types have the same utility or disutility from receiving a call. Thus,
the utility from receiving a call is independent of type (although the utility
from outgoing calls is type-dependent). Initially, it seems realistic to assume
that if the utility from an outgoing call is a function of type, the utility from
an incoming call should be a function of type too. However, outgoing and
incoming calls can be quite different services (see (3) below).
18Network externalities are an important issue in telecommunications and are often divided
into access externalities and call externalities. The access externality encompasses the fact
that a consumer's valuation of a network subscription increases as additional subscribers are
connected. The call externality is the benefit of being called without paying for the call.
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3. A consumer makes an active choice of consumption when he makes an out-
going call. With ordinary rationality assumptions he does not make outgo-
ing calls that give him negative net utility. The situation is quite different
for incoming calls. If for a moment we leave the digital age with number
identification, answering a call may bring both positive and negative expe-
riences for most people. Thus, our assumption is that the aggregate utility
from receiving calls is zero for each consumer. In our context this implies
especially that type 2 consumers are unaffected whether type 1 consumers
are served or not (i.e., whether type 1 consumers can make outgoing calls
or not).
Since the assumptions (1), (2) and (3) eliminate both the access and the call
externalities, we can define U as a type independent reservation utility and we
assume that U o. U represents the consumer surplus from being connected to
the network (i.e., the utility from receiving calls).
Given that all consumers subscribe to the basic service, we want to explore the
strategy of a firm which uses quality in addition to quantity as a means to separate
the consumer groups. The high quality service gives a quantity discount to high
quantity users, whereas the low quality service gives a "calling pattern discount"
to low quantity users. Hence, the model restricts the consumer's option by saying
that he must buy either high or low quality, i.e., he cannot buy a combination of
high and low.
The variable qi = {qf, qfl} is a quantity vector for outgoing calls of the two
qualities H and L (i = 1,2) and, according to what we said previously, we restrict
our attention to the case where qi = {(O, qfl) , (qf, O)}. If the firm were to sell
only one quality, it would certainly choose to sell H. Also, if the firm finds it
profitable to sell the low quality product, this will always be intended for type
1 consumers. The question is which of the bundles ql = {O,qf}, ql = {O,O},
or ql = {qf, °}, the monopoly will offer these consumers. In order to make the
notation simple we define qf = {qf, O} and qf = {O, qf}. Total payment for
the quantity qf_ is TI, (i = 1, 2, j = H, L). Since the monopoly will always sell
high quality (H) to type 2 consumers, the contract designed for these always
has q2 = q!J and payment Tr. With asymmetric information the firm has to
design contracts for the two consumer groups in such a way that it is optimal for
each consumer type to reveal private information through the choice of contract.
When consumers can have either high or low willingness to pay for quantity, the
consumer with low willingness to pay has no incentive to claim that he has high
willingness to pay. The problem is to induce type 2 consumers to reveal their
private information. The theoretical presentation takes advantage of the relevant
theoretical results within the theory of mechanism design, see Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991, chapter 7) and Tirole (1988, chapter 3).
The consumers have the following quasi-linear preferences for H and L re-
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spectively'?
01V (qfl) - Tf
01V (qf) - TP
U=O
if he is served with H
if he is served with L
otherwise
(2.1)
02V (q¥) - TJ!
a02V (qf) - Tt
U=O
if he is served with H
if he is served with L
otherwise
(2.2)
O2 > 01, a ::; 1. The V (-) function is common knowledge. The argument in
the V (.) function is a quantity variable being of either high or low quality (one of
the vectors defined above). The function captures consumers' type independent
qualityordering. The parameter Oi is private information and indicates consumer
type i's willingness to pay for quantity. The a-parameter captures that quality
preferences are also type contingent - because of type contingent differences in
calling patterns. With our previous assumptions on the calling patterns a has to
be lower than 1. This takes into account the fact that type 2 consumers call a
significantly larger fraction of the network than do type 1 consumers. Thus, type
2 consumers would be harmed more if they had to reduce their call distribution.
Consequently, type 2 consumers value H relative to L higher than do type 1
consumers. Hence, if we suppose that type 1 weakly prefers a given bundle of H
to a given bundle of L, then type 2 strictly prefers H to L.
Assumption 2.1 We make thefollowing assumptions related to consumers' pref-
erences and the firm 's costs (where subscript indicates partial derivative)
a02 2: 01
CL 2: CH
Vq(O) 2: cH jOl
Assumption 2.1(a) implies that the utility function is strictly increasing and
strictly concave. Assumption 2.1(b) captures the consumers' preference ordering
which implies that the marginal utility of one extra unit of H is at least as
high as the marginal utility of one extra unit of L. In our context, this is quite
intuitive, since the possibility set, i.e., the termination points available, is higher
with H than with L. When a consumer buys H, he can always imitate the calling
patterns he would choose with L. However, ifhe buys L, he cannot always imitate
the calling patterns he may choose with H. Most of the time, we will simplify
19Income effects are excluded in the model. However, this does not rule out differences in
income between the two consumer types. The differences in income may be embodied in the
type-parameter. In effect, we assume that the amount of money spent on a network subscription
and usage of quantity is small relative to the total income for each consumer. In addition, qH
and qL are variants of the same product and are independent.
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the results by assuming that it makes no difference which of the vectors defined
above that enters as the argument in the V(·)-function, i.e., Vq (qH) = Vq (qL)
for qL = qH.
Assumption 2.1 (c) ensures that the high demand consumers always get higher
net surplus than the low demand consumers for equal quantity-outlay allocations.
Assumptions 2.1(a), (b) and (c) ensure that the single crossing condition holds,
i.e., that the indifference curves of the two types cross only once, even when L
is offered.P Then, Assumptions 2.1 (a), (b) and (c) imply that if the monopoly
sells one quality only, it will sell H. Hence, the monopoly will always offer
type 2 consumers high quality. Assumption 2.1(d) indicates that L is a damaged
(altered) version of H. Thus, L is at least as costly to produce as H. For example,
Friends and Family programs imply extra costs of monitoring, registration and
billing, and the introduction of L is not motivated by cost reductions. Assumption
2.1(e) ensures that type 1 is served with full information.
2.2.1 Single quality
Traditionally, telecom companies have not discriminated along the quality dimen-
sion but offered the high quality service with perfect interconnectivity between all
subscribers. We will take this as a starting point and assume that the monopoly
only offers high quality (H). The monopoly uses quantity as a sorting device and
offers two take- it-or-leave- it contracts, {qfl, Tf} and {q!j, Ti!}. In a single qual-
ity model, we apply the standard concept of second-degree price discrimination
described in Tirole (1988).
The monopoly's profit iS21
(2.3)
The monopoly maximizes profit subject to a restriction that the consumers
participate voluntarily - the participation constraint (PCi) - and that each con-
sumer chooses the contract, {qfl, ~H}, intended for his type, the incentive con-
straint (I Ci). If the first restriction is satisfied for type 1, it is automatically
satisfied for type 2 since type 2 can always choose the contract intended for type
1 and get a higher net surplus. Hence, PCI is the only binding participation
constraint in the problem, when both types are served. Further, the incentive
constraint is only downward-binding, Le., type 2 consumers should not want
to consume type 1 consumers' bundle, hence IC2 is the only binding incentive
20The single crossing condition holds if the marginal willingness to pay increases in a single
dimensional parameter. With our definition of the support of (h and a, the type parameter
collapses into a single-dimension. Here, single crossing followsdirectly from Assumption 2.1(c)
(given (a) and (b)). See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), chapter 7.
21Subscript 12 indicates the type, and superscript H H indicates that both types are offered
high quality.
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constraint.P When these two constraints are satisfied, each consumer type will
choose the contract {qf, ~H} intended for his type
Bl V (q{f) - Tf = O,
B2V(q:) -Tfl =B2V(q{f) -TlH•
(2.4)
(2.5)
The firm maximizes profit with respect to qfl and q!j, subject to 2.4, 2.5 and
both qfl and q!j must be nonnegative. By substituting Tf and Tt! in the profit
we can write the maximization problem
HH (H H)max '1r12 ql' q2
qfi,q¥
S.t. q{f 2: O, q: 2: O.
(2.6)
The following Kuhn- Tucker conditions will describe a global maximum
[AlBl - (1 - Al) (B2 - BI)] Vq (q{f) - AlCH < O, (2.8)
- O if q{f > O.
If type 1 is served and q{f > O,we have
CH
Bl Vq (q{f) = 1- Al B2 - Bl '1- ------
Al Bl
This is the standard result of second-degree price discrimination known as
"no distortion at the top". Type 2 consumers are given socially optimal quantity,
while type 1 consumers face an efficiency distortion. The only way to reduce the
information rent to a type 2 consumer is to make the offer to type 1 less attractive
for type 2. The monopoly does so by reducing qfl. We see a trade-off between
allocative efficiency and rent extraction (reward to type 2) and the monopoly
sacrifices efficiency in order to reduce the information rent (and thus increase
profit). We suppose that Vq (qfl) > CH jBl for qfl = O. This ensures that the
monopoly serves type 1 with H under complete information (i.e., the first best
solution). Provided that the demand side heterogeneity is not too large, both
(2.9)
22This has a simple economic intuition. Both consumer types have private information about
their preferences, but only type 2 consumers have valuable private information. To prevent type
2 from "cheating" and choosing the contract intended for type l he must be given an information
rent. The monopoly will minimize the level of the information rent and therefore IC2 will bind
in the profit maximization problem. A type 1 consumer has no incentive to misreport his type
and his private information has no value, hence, PCl is binding. See Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991 ).
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types are served if H is the only quality offer. The monopoly chooses to serve
both types if
(2.10)
If condition (2.10) is violated, type 1 is offered the bundle {qfl, Tfl} = {O,O}.
Condition (2.10) is simple to obtain by taking the right-hand limit of (2.9), as
qfl approaches zero. If the right hand side is larger than the left hand side it
is profitable to increase qfl. If type 1 is excluded, PC2 will be the only binding
constraint and the information rent is zero (there will no longer be any binding
incentive compatibility constraints in the problem).
2.2.2 Damaging
With damaging the monopoly may offer an inferior substitute with restrictions
on call distribution. This service will only be intended for type 1 consumers.
Damaging introduces quality as an additional sorting device. In the assumptions
made above, the two consumer types are heterogeneous with respect to their use
of network subscription, the quality level of L is exogenous and consumers have
a choice between Hand L. The monopoly offers a menu of take-it-or-leave-it
contracts, {qf, Tf} intended for type 1 and {q!f, T.f} intended for type 2.
The monopoly's profit is
(2.11)
where Tf and T.f are determined by the relevant participation and incentive
constraints
OlV (qf) - TF
02V (q:) - Ti!
O,
a02V (qf) - TF·
(2.12)
(2.13)
The maximization problem can be stated as
LH (L H)max 'lr12 ql' q2qf ,q!f
s.t. qf 2: O, q: 2: O.
(2.14)
From the new incentive constraint 2.13 it appears that if the firm chooses
to serve type 1 some given amount of L instead of H it can extract larger rents
from type 2. Since the participation constraint for type 1 is unchanged, the profit
contribution from type 1 is also unchanged. Hence, if the firm serves type 1 with
L instead of H revenues are increased. Consequently, if damaging has no cost, the
firm will always sell low quality to type 1, i.e., damaging is an effective screening
instrument provided that it is not too costly to use.
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The first order condition with respect to q!j is unchanged from (2.7) and type
2 consumers are still offered the socially optimal quantity. If type 1 is served, the
Kuhn- Tucker condition translates into deciding on qf such that
CL
Bl Vq (qf) = 1 - Al aB2 - Bl .1--------
Al Bl
(2.15)
The first order condition with respect to qf differs from the first order con-
dition with respect to qfl. The reason is the effect of vertical differentiation (as-
sumptions 2.1(b) and (c)), and the cost effect (assumption 2.1(d)). We assume
that Vq (qf) > CL /Bl for qf = O. The monopoly serves both types if
CL
Bl > (1 - Al) aB2 + Al Vq (Or
Since a < 1, condition (2.10) is a stronger condition than (2.16) if CL is close
to CH. We can state that (2.10) is a stronger condition than (2.16) provided that
(2.16)
1- Al
Al B2Vq (O) [1 - aj 2: cL - CH.
Then, we might have a case where (2.10) is violated, whereas (2.16) is satisfied.
That is, the monopoly excludes type 1 if it serves him with H, but offers him a
positive amount if it serves him with L.23
In assessing the implications of introducing an inferior substitute, it turns out
to be crucial whether the monopoly serves both types or only type 2 consumers
with H.
(2.17)
Case i: Type 1 is not served when only high quality is offered, i.e., type 1 is
served with L instead of being excluded. This implies that (2.10) is violated,
but (2.16) is satisfied. 7f~~is the benchmark for the monopoly when it
considers introducing a damaged good, and damaging is profitable if ~7f =
7fLH _ 7fOH > O 24
12 12 .
Case ii: Type 1 is served when high quality is the only offer, i.e., type 1 is
served with L instead of H. This implies that both (2.10) and (2.16) will
be satisfied. 7f~H is the benchmark and damaging is profitable if ~7f =
7fff - 7f~H > O.
23Note that with the contract {qfl, Tfl} = {O,O}type 1 has de facto no termination points
available. Therefore, from type l's point ofview the contract {qfl,Tfl} = {O,O}is even more
damaged than the contract {qf, TF} where qf > O.
247rf2H is the profit when type 1 is served with a positive quantity of L in (2.14), i.e.,
7rhH = Al (Ol V (qf) - cLqf) + (1- Al) [02V (qlf) - (0:02 - Ol) V (qf) - cHqlfl. Whereas
7r~lf is the profit when type 1 is excluded and PC2 is the only binding constraint, Le.,
7r~lf = (1- Al) (02V (q¥) - cHqlf).
24
The distinction between case i and ii represents two different incentives be-
hind a practice of damaging. If it is to serve consumers that absent damaging
would not be served, it extracts rent from type 1 consumers (case i) - although
the information rent to type 2 increases. A different incentive to practice dam-
aging exists because it enables the firm to reduce the information rent to type 2
- although the cost of serving type 1 increases (case ii).
Case i
Type 1 is served with L instead of being excluded, and damaging has two effects,
(1) it enables the firm to extract surplus from type 1, but (2) increases the
information rent to type 2.
Evaluated globally, damaging is profitable if ?rff > ?r~!f
(2.18)
When quantity is the only sorting device qfl completely determines the in-
formation rent to type 2. The only way to reduce the information rent is to
decrease the quantity to type 1. If the monopoly offers the damaged service L to
type 1, this will influence the information rent to type 2 because the two goods
are offered on different terms. Rather than using quantity distortions to reduce
information rent, the monopoly may introduce quality distortions too. The like-
lihood of profitable damaging increases with the difference in preferences for L
between type 1 and type 2, in other words, if ex decreases. Since ex is less than 1,
the information rent to type 2 for a given quantity of L to type 1 is lower than
if the same quantity of H were offered to type 1. The cost of damaging will of
course influence the profitability of damaging. In addition to the reduction of the
information rent, the monopoly may be able to increase profits from type 1 by
offering a positive amount of the damaged service.
The firm's incentive to practice damaging is positive if it will serve type 1
with a marginal positive quantity ~qf instead of qfl = O, i.e., if25
O + ~qf L
~ L C
()l > (1 -.AI) ex()2 +.Al V (O +~~f)- V (O) ,
~qf
(2.19)
taking the limit as ~qf goes to zero gives us a "serve type 1 with L instead
of zero" condition, which is of course a re-statement of (2.16), the condition that
type 1 is being served with L.
Hence, for ()l in some interval [()~,()~lthe firm will serve type 1with L instead of
H, provided that this interval exists such that ()~< ()~.The boundaries are deter-
mined by ()~= (1 - .AI) ex()2 +.Al (CL jVq(O)) and ()~= (1 - .AI) ()2 +.Al (cH j(Vq(O)).
25From now on we will use the assumption that V (qL) = V (qH) for qL = qH.
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The interval becomes smaller the higher is a and the higher is CL, for a equal to 1
such an interval never exists, - obviously, since damaging has no effect. Formally,
we can show that both cL 2: cH and ()~< ()~cannot be true when a = 1. If cL
is strictly above CH, a can be strictly below 1 and damaging will still not be
profitable.
If damaging occurs, we know that the monopoly makes more profit. Further-
more, type 2 is better off since he derives a positive surplus from consumption.
Type 1 derives no net surplus in either case. Thus, there is a Pareto-improvement.
The paradox here is that it is the practice of price discrimination and of costly
damaging that leads to the Pareto-improvement. This case corresponds to the
dual use case in Deneckere and McAfee (1996) where they show that a Pareto-
improvement occurs when the type 2 segment is substantially more profitable
than the type 1 segment. Hence, absent damaging, type 1 consumers would not
have been served. However, a Pareto-improvement arises for different reasons.
In the Deneckere and McAfee (1996) article, it arises from the fact that if low
demand consumers are served, they have to extract a positive surplus when they
are charged a linear price. In our model a Pareto-improvement arises not because
type 1 consumers benefit, but entirely because type 2 consumers earn a positive
information rent when type 1 consumers are served.
Case ii
What are the implications of introducing an inferior substitute L when both types
would be offered a positive amount even when only H were offered? Type 1 is
served with L instead of H, and damaging has two effects, (1) it increases the
cost of serving type 1, but (2) decreases the information rent to type 2.
In case ii, evaluated globally damaging is profitable if 7rf:fI > 7r~H
(1 - .xl) (}2 [V (qf) - aV (qf)J - (}l [V (qf) - V (qf)J >
.xl (cLqf - CHqf) .
(2.20)
The left-hand side of equation (2.20) represents the net gain from damaging.
The cost effect appears on the right-hand side. The first part of the left-hand
side is the change in the information rent and the second part is the change in
type 1 consumers' willingness to pay. Type 1 consumers' willingness to pay is
affected by a possible change in quantity (qfl =J. qf) and by vertical differentiation,
(V (qfl) 2: V (qf), for qfl = qf)· The right-hand side is a pure cost effect which
is nonnegative if qf > qfl silnce CL 2: CH. If the effect of vertical differentiation is
small and the cost difference between producing L instead of H is small, then the
net effect of introducing damaging will more likely be positive, i.e., the reduction
in information rent to type 2 will more likely outweigh the costs of damaging.
It turns out that the incentive to practice damaging is not as easy to identify
as in the previous case. Whether the incentive to produce L is (marginally)
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stronger than the incentive to produce H must be evaluated globally and will
therefore give less intuition. Ideally, we would like to compare the marginal
profits evaluated at q = Oand use the condition å7rff /åq 2:: å7rIJH /åq to assess
whether the monopoly will serve type 1 with L instead of H. (As long as we
assume that q!j is chosen optimally, profit 7r{~ is a function of only q{, j = L, H).
However, it will be sufficient to do so only under the condition that 7rIJH is more
concave as well. If 7rff is the most concave of the two profit functions, it might
well reach its maximum at a lower profit level. The profit function 7rff is more
concave than 7r~H if
d
2
[LH )]-dqi 7r12 (q
:q [7rff (q)]
(2.21)
This is a measure of concavity that is invariant to positive linear transforma-
tions. Necessary and sufficient conditions for L to be chosen by the firm can be
stated as
<
CL - CH Al
(2.22)Cl:: 1-
192Vq (O) 1 - Al'
CL CL - CH Bl (2.23)o >
cH CH 192 (1 - Al)"
If the right-hand side in (2.22) is smaller than the right-hand side in (2.23),
comparing marginal profits for q = Oyields a sufficient condition. However, we
can show that this is not sufficient and the following condition is never met
(2.24)
Doing some manipulation on this inequality results in the following condition
CL - CH > cL - cH [ 1 ] [Bl _ CH /02]
CH - CH (1 - Al) 192 Al Vq (O) ,
(2.25)
which can never be true because the product of the two brackets on the right-
hand side exceeds 1. To see this we can check whether the contrary can be true
(2.26)
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of marginal profits and the concavity of the profit func-
tions
But since we are in a regime where type 1 would have been served with H,
i.e., that Ol 2: (1 - AI) O2 + Al [cH /Vq (O)], (2.26) yields a contradiction. The
problem is illustrated in figure (2.1) in the case that V (q) = q - ~q2 and for a
set of chosen parameter values.
Since the information rent is reduced in case ii, type 2 is worse off, and,
contrary to case i, damaging cannot lead to a Pareto-improvement. Nevertheless,
the monopoly may still find damaging profitable in this case. This incentive
to practice damaging will only exist under nonlinear pricing and represents an
extension of the analysis in Deneckere and McAfee (1996).
Let us briefly summarize the last section. If, absent damaging, the distortions
towards type 1 consumers are so large that they are de facto excluded from con-
suming a positive amount, then the introduction of an inferior version increases
the information rent to type 2. However, it might still be profitable for the firm
because it can extract rent from type 1 consumers. Thus, such a strategy might
lead to a Pareto-improvement. However, if type 1 consumers in fact consume a
positive amount even absent damaging, the introduction of an inferior good is
profitable because it leads to a decrease in the information rent to type 2. Because
consumers value quality differently, a restriction on call distribution provides the
firm with additional means of rent extraction. In the latter case, none of the
consumer types gain, and type 2 consumers actually lose surplus from the pricing
strategy under such circumstances. By adding a new type-dimension, the firm is
28
0.8
--~-- ---- -------
[O] [i] [iii
0.6
T(.TJI
0.4
0.2
,
,
, ,, ,
t,/
.i->:_----,
o 0.2
CL = 0.7
CH = O..)
a = 0.75
0.4 0.8
Figure 2.2: Payments from type 1 and 2, when ql = qfl (solid line) and when
ql = qf (dotted line). Tt is the lower schedules and T,fl is the higher schedules.
able to reduce the price towards type 1 consumers without violating the incentive
compatibility constraints.
The figures (2.2) and (2.3) illustrate our findings in the case that V (q) =
q - ~q2. Figure 2.2 shows how the payments from the two types are affected by
the introduction of L. In the interval marked [O],where Al is small, the firm
excludes type 1 and extract all surplus from type 2. In the interval [i] type 1 is
served with H instead of being excluded. Type 2 pays less, but there is a net
gain from introducing L that outweighs the cost. In [ii] type 1 is served with L
instead of H, and the firm extracts larger surplus from type 2. Finally, in [H]
the firm will not consider to serve type 1 with L.
2.3 Damaged goods in telecommunications
Telecom companies have traditionally offered a standard tariff which simply con-
sists of a monthly fee (A) and a usage price (p). This is the standard tariff
consumers need in order to be connected to the network and receive calls.26 It is
a high quality product in the sense that one can make calls to the entire network
26If we abstract from variations in the usage price for long-distance/local calls and peak/off-
peak hours, this is a two-part tariff as the Standard tariff in figure 2.4(a). The fee for be-
ing connected to the network and the monthly fee are set at a relatively low level. In most
OECD-countries the telephony penetration is therefore very high, i.e. a large share of both the
residential and business segments is connected to the network.
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Figure 2.3: Configurations of Al and a that lead the monopoly to exclude type
1, to serve him with L instead of exclusion (case (i)), with L instead of H (case
(ii)), or to serve him with H. To keep the assumption that a()2 2: fh, a must be
larger than 0.6.
and to interconnected networks. However, the usage price (p) has been relatively
high, which to a large extent has excluded some network subscribers from making
outgoing calls.
A series of additional tariffs have been introduced during the last decade,
tariffs that. are optional additions to the st.andard tariff. A large number of these
tariffs provides pure quantity discounts to high quantity users. By paying an
addition to the monthly fixed fee (AP) the user obtains a reduction in the usage
price (pP), i.e. pP < p. This is the Premium tariff in figure 2.4(a).
Another class of additional tariffs is what we denote Calling circle tariffs.
Calling circle tariffs also provide quantity discounts at an additional monthly fee
(AGG). However, the quantity discount is only effective on a given number of pre-
selected numbers, defined as the calling circle. Thus, the calling circle is a list of
people that you call frequently, e.g. ten pre-selected numbers (members). Calls
to these members are charged a discounted usage price (pGG) and calls outside
the calling circle are charged according to the Standard tariff (p).
In many real world examples of Calling circle tariffs both the monthly fee
and the usage price are lower than in the Premium tariff, i.e. AP 2: AGG and
pP 2: pGG. Hence, the Premium tariff would not be implementable without the
restrictions on call distribution in the Calling circle tariff. The restriction on call
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Figure 2.4: Nonlinear tariffs with damaging
distribution is the reason why some customers prefer the Premium tariff rather
than the Calling circle tariff.27 For instance, if only the Standard tariff and the
Premium tariff are offered, the private consumer would choose the Standard tar-
iff, and his usage will be restricted because of the higher usage price. The phone
marketing company is likely to buy the Premium tariff. The introduction of a
Calling circle tariff enables the firm to reduce the usage price to the private con-
sumer without tempting the phone marketing company to alter its tariff choice.
Related to the model in chapter 2, a combination of the Standard tariff and the
additional Premium tariff could be seen as the high quality product H. The
combination of the Standard tariff and the Calling circle tariff will be analogous
to the damaged product L.
The Friends and Family tariffs that are offered by most telecom firms are
very similar to the originalone offered by MCI. Although the specific features
of the Calling circle tariffs in other countries may vary, the generic feature is
very much the same. They all discount a certain calling pattern. The tariffs
offered by Tele Danmark restrict the distribution of calls to six numbers, with
discounts of 15 and 5 percent for off-peak and peak traffic respectively. The tariff
discounts all off-peak traffic by 5 percent as well. The former Swedish monopoly,
Telia, restricts call distribution to 3 numbers. Telia also offers tariffs that provide
27Theway of reducing the quality in the Calling circle tariff is in many ways analogous to
that of rebated tickets in the airline industry where you are required to stay away from home
Saturday night. This is more of a "punishment" to business travellers who want to get back
home for the weekend, whereas it is not as big a problem for leisure travellers who often want
to stay for the weekend. For leisure travellers, rebated tickets are almost perfect substitutes to
the high quality product.
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discounts on all calls to a specific geographic area.
The ever-growing market for information services may affect individuals' call
distribution and calling pattern in general. Residential subscribers who are heavy
users of the Internet demand at the extreme one point of call termination, the
Internet Service Provider's point of presence. When local calls are billed by the
minute users of the Internet become high quantity users of local calls. Our model
suggests that it may be possible to design a fiat rate plan (without a usage price)
that fits the needs of the Internet users without creating significant revenue losses
in the residential market as a whole (i.e., subscribers on the Standard tariff).
Empirical observations suggest that damaging is often introduced and contin-
uously developed as a response to competition from a low quality product. The
following section gives an example from the (competitive) cellular market in Den-
mark. The company Sonofon received its license to operate cellular services on
a DCS 1800 network in Denmark in March 1997. In addition to offering mobile
services, Sonofon wanted to offer a closer substitute to the fixed link telephony
network subscription from Tele Denmark, the former PSTN monopoly. However,
mobile services are priced to extract consumers' willingness to pay not only for
quantity but also for mobility. In order to compete for Tele Denmark's fixed
link subscribers (who presumably are subscribers who do not value mobility very
highly) the mobile provider has to reduce the usage price in tariffs with low fixed
fees. But - by doing so, this will cannibalize their revenues from high volume
consumers of mobile telephony. Consequently, because Sonofon provides a service
that has a high value to some consumers they became a "softer" competitor in
the fixed link market.
To limit the cannibalization effect Sonofon has introduced a new tariff as a
supplement to the standard mobile tariffs. The new tariff is designed such that
a lower usage price is paid when the mobile phone is used from the subscriber's
home zone or, more exactly, from the area inside or near the home, than from
outside the home zone. The home zone is equal to the cell in which the sub-
scriber's home is located. On calls from outside the home zone, the subscriber
pays the standard price on the standard mobile tariff. The Home zone tariff is
then an additional tariff where an additional monthly fee is paid in order to get
a reduction in usage price for the calls made from home. In the DCS technology,
the area that is covered by one cell is quite small.F' This area becomes the home
zone and is the area to which the Home zone tariff is related.
The novelty of the supplement is that it enables the firm to compete with the
prices on fixed link telephony when consumers make calls from home, without
making significant revenue losses from mobile calls originating from outside home.
28Mobileor cellular networks consist of a grid of cells. The signals in DeS networks can not
travel as far as the signals in GSM networks. Because the area covered by one cell is larger
in GSM, this implies a greater cannibalization effect of mobile traffic (calls originated from
outside home). Thus, the revenue loss from introducing a home zone tariff is probably greater
in a GSM network than in a DeS network.
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Because of the restrictions on the mobility in the tariff, the Home zone tariff can
be viewed as a damaged product when mobility is regarded as a vertical quality
dimension.
The Home zone tariff described above can be thought of as an "inverse"
Friends and Family tariff. In a Friends and Family tariff a quality reduction is
achieved by a restriction on call termination points, whereas a quality reduction
in the Home zone tariff is achieved by a restriction on the point of call origination.
2.4 Concluding remarks
The paper focuses on the effects of a restriction on call distribution, used as a
sorting device in a problem with nonlinear pricing. The firm can produce an
inferior substitute by restricting the number of termination points (call distribu-
tion), i.e., a damaged service, where the damaging may be costly. If the damaged
service is sold at a lower price than the high quality service, price discrimination
occurs, and such a practice may under certain conditions give rise to a Pareto-
improvement.
Whether damaging is profitable or not, depends upon the incentive behind it.
If the incentive is to serve consumers that absent damaging would not be served,
damaging enables the firm to extract rent from low demand types. This may
happen in a case where the low demand consumers are excluded when only high
quality is offered. Since the individual rationality constraint for these consumers
binds in both cases, they are equally well off with or without damaging. High
demand consumers have to be given a positive information rent if low demand
consumers are served with a positive amount, and thus, they obtain increased
utility. Hence, in this case the firm and high demand consumers are better off
and damaging leads to a Pareto-improvement.
The other incentive to practice damaging exists because it enables the firm
to reduce the information rent to high demand consumers. When low demand
consumers are offered an inferior substitute instead of the high quality product,
the incentive to mimic a low demand consumer is reduced. Hence, in this case
the firm is at least able to extract larger surplus from high demand consumers.
In addition, the efficiency distortions, via the pricing rule, towards low demand
consumers are reduced. Depending on the costs of damaging and on low demand
consumers' valuation of the damaged good relative to the high quality product,
the firm is able to extract higher surplus from low demand consumers as well.
So, in the end, damaging can not lead to a Pareto-improvement in this case, and
both the profit and welfare effects are more ambiguous.
When firms interact strategically, damaging may be given other motivations
than a way to separate consumers. As already mentioned, Friends and Family
can be seen as creating lock-in effects or switching costs, and this may be part of
the motivation behind Friends and Family in an oligopolistic market. In addition,
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a firm that faces competition may want to introduce a new version (by damaging)
to achieve a full line of products in order to deter entry (Deneckere and McAfee,
1996).
For simplicity, we have chosen to let the quality of L be exogenous, although
this is not an accurate description in all cases. Sometimes the quality level is
clearly endogenous. For example, the network operator sets the limitation on
termination in the Friends and Family programs. On the other hand, it is natural
to think of the quality level in the home zone tariff as exogenous.
From a more practical point of view, there are additional implications. A firm
should design a high quality product such that it can be damaged, or versioned,
later on. This point also stresses the importance of owning or controlling the
network technology and ancillary systems, such as billing and registration, since
this would enable firms to design products such as Friends and Family more
easily (see also Varian (2000)).
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Chapter 3
Two-Part Tariffs with Partial
Unbundling
by Sissel Jensen*
3.1 Introduction
Consumers are often heterogeneous along numerous dimensions. In telecommuni-
cations, for example, consumers differ with respect to the quantity they purchase
(minutes called) as well as in their calling pattern (whom they call, when they
call, the duration of each call, etc.). With a few notable exceptions, the literature
does not address the question on how a monopoly should price discriminate in a
market with multidimensional heterogeneity.i" The purpose of this paper is to
*1am grateful for comments from Petter Osmundsen, Fred Schroyen, Lars Sørgard and Jon
Vislie. I also thank seminar participants at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, and at the 3rd Nordic Workshop in Industrial Organization (NORIO III) in
Helsinki for helpful comments.
29Workon multi-dimensional screening includes different kinds of problems, see Rochet and
Stole (2000). One polar case is when consumers are described by several characteristics but the
firm has only one instrument at hand, references are Laffont et al. (1987), Lewis and Sappington
(1989), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), and Jullien (2000). The other polar case is when
consumers are described by one characteristic but the firm can use several instruments, as in
Matthews and Moore (1987)with risk-aversion, or as in Sappington (1983), and Caillaud et al.
(1988) with several observables and instruments. Rochet and Chene (1998), and Armstrong
and Rochet (1999) work within a model with several instruments and several characteristics,
also providing an overview of the literature. Wilson (1993) provides definitions and examples
of multidimensional goods and multidimensional pricing. Deneckere and McAfee (1996) and
Foros et al. (1999) present models similar to the one presented in this paper; Deneckere and
McAfeewith uniform pricing and Foros et al. with nonlinear pricing, but in both articles the
restriction on usage is exogenous.
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explore how a monopoly might use two instruments to enhance the profitability
from second degree price discrimination.
When consumers' willingness to pay is private information and the firm must
condition the contract upon observable variables, it is most often assumed that
the firm can observe only one variable. It is also common to assume that the
observed variable is single dimensional, e.g., quality in Mussa and Rosen (1978)
and quantity in Maskin and Riley (1984). Although being welfare improving com-
pared to uniform pricing, the performance of second degree price discrimination
relative to first best practice (marginal-cost pricing) depends upon the degree of
the demand side heterogeneity.i" In general therefore, any strategy that increases
the observability of consumers' willingness to pay will increase profit and welfare.
In the present paper a monopoly firm sells a single generic good, for instance
minutes of network usage. Each quantity increment can be assigned a unique
list of observable attributes, such as time-of-day, distance, call termination point,
etc, and this describes a consumer's calling pattern. By monitoring consumers'
calling patterns, the firm is able to offer a tariff intended for low demand con-
sumers on terms that differ from the terms on which high demand consumers
make their purchases. Such practice can potentially improve "the observabil-
ity" of consumers' characteristics in terms of self-selection, and thus implies less
distortions towards low demand consumers.
It is possible to translate the multidimensionality implied by differences in
calling patterns into a multiproduct setting by letting units assigned different sets
of attributes be treated as different products. If the firm ignores the heterogeneity
in consumers' calling patterns but charge all units the according to the same tariff,
it aggregates all taste parameters and practice complete bundling. In the present
context we let the firm bundle a subset of the products and charge units within
this product bundle according to a different tariff. The firm do not debundle
completely, and hence, we refer to this practice as partial bundling."
We hold on to the assumption that consumers differ in their marginal will-
ingness to pay for quantity and say that there are two types of consumers, high
demand and low demand consumers. In addition, we assume that consumers
with different willingness to pay also have distinctly different calling patterns. In
particular, high demand consumers make calls to a large number of subscribers,
30Theprice-cost margin depends on the range of the type-space and on the firm's prior beliefs
about the distribution of types over this space. If the heterogeneity on the demand side is large
then a large fraction of consumers pay a price well above marginal cost.
31In the multiproduct setting it would be the case that although the firm has imperfect
knowledgeabout a given consumer's taste for one product, it knows that it is perfectly correlated
with the taste for any other product. Miravete (2001) study multidimensional screening where
different type components distinguish quality dimensions of products that can be aggregated.
The ability to aggregate type components opens the possibility to reduce the dimensionality
of the screening process. Sibley and Srinagesh (1997) explore the difference between screening
the different dimensions of consumer types independently by means of two-part tariffs and the
alternative of bundling all taste parameters to design a single two-part tariff.
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whereas low demand consumers make calls to a small number of subscribers.
High-dispersion subscribers can be thought of as business consumers while low
dispersion subscribers can be thought of as residential consumers. The firm of-
fers a menu of two-part tariffs, each specifying a fixed fee that must be paid
up-front, a marginal usage price, and in addition use-of-service restrictions which
consumers must obey. Customers choose their preferred tariff scheme and usage
is subsequently billed according to this choice.
The predominant method of charging consumers for telecom usage has been
to bill for the length of time a connection is used. All multi-dimensionality
in the consumers' use of the service was translated into a single-dimensional
quantity variable (pulses, and later minutes). The practice of sorting consumers
with different willingness to pay for usage was handled by giving high demand
consumers quantity discount, in consistence with single-dimensional screening
models. Today the multi-dimensionality in usage patterns is to an increasing
extent used to achieve separation. Tariff options known as Friends and Family
and Best Friend are examples of discounts given on certain calling patterns. Other
examples are telecom companies that offer discounts on dial-up internet access,
in the form of discounts on standard calling rates or in the form of a monthly
fixed fee for a fixed number of hours of usage, (flat rate dial-up internet access).32
Firms' use of calling circle tariffs has received some attention in other areas in
the economics literature. Wang and Wen (1998) consider a duopoly model with
demand side heterogeneity, where such pricing behavior enables a new firm to
enter the market despite the presence of consumer switching costs. This result is
derived under specific assumptions about consumer calling patterns, specifically
that low demand types make calls to other low demand types, whereas high de-
mand types make calls to other high demand types. By relaxing this assumption
one might conclude differently (see Klemperer (1995) for a survey on the switch-
ing cost literature). Laffont et al. (1998) examine the effects of discriminatory
pricing on the negotiated interconnection agreements between rival network op-
erators. When a network operator charges different prices for calls terminating
on the subscriber's network and those terminating on a rivals network he can
generate network externalities despite network interconnection.
Throughout the paper we shall hold on to a simple example applied to telecom-
munications and assume that consumers with different willingness to pay for the
service have distinctly different calling patterns. Section 2 describes the generic
features of telecommunications that are relevant for this paper. The aim in Sec-
tion 3 is to give a definition of the quantity variable that the usage charge in a
two-part tariff applies to. Section 4 presents the dem and- and supply side con-
ditions of the market as well as the informational constraints faced by the firm.
Finally, in section 5 we draw conclusions from the analysis.
32Dial-up internet access is in this way singled out as a separate product.
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3.2 Telecommunications services
The telecommunications market has experienced rapid changes during the last
decades. A large variety of services are nowadays provided on a common platform
and the technology convergence gives rise to significant changes in the demand
side of the market as well. New services at reasonable prices and more multifunc-
tional customer premises equipment, for instance the world wide web, personal
computers, and all applications on the web, have also led to large increases in
the demand for transmission capacity (time length or more bandwidth). Built-in
network intelligence and sophisticated monitoring of usage have enabled firms
in the market to move from billing customers for single dimensional pulses to
billing multidimensional minutes. The method of pricing a call used to be by a
conversion from hour-of-day, day-of-week, distance, etc, to pulses by tables in the
central office. The firm had no information about a consumer's demand other
than the number of pulses consumed at the end of the billing period. Network
technology and billing systems now price a call minute according to a detailed call
record. Hence, the firm possesses very detailed information about a consumer's
usage pattern.
The telecommunications network is a two-way network and a person or a ma-
chine that is present at one specific node asks for some type of communication
with another specific node at some given hour, weekday, etc.33 Even though a
one minute call within a specific calling area is a perfectly standardized product,
its point of destination is of vital importance to the consumer who makes the
call. A consumer does not derive any benefit from a call which destines at a
B-subscriber he did not intend to call.34 The same feature also applies to in-
formation services generated at a specific network node. These are features of
telecommunications that make it a multi-dimensional good. For instance, indi-
vidual call records usually contain information about at what hour the call is
made, who is the B-subscriber, and where the B-subscriber is located (local, long
distance, international). Furthermore, subscribers are typically billed according
to aggregate minutes (seconds) of peak-time long distance calling, off-peak long
distance calling, peak-time international calling, etc. There are examples of ser-
vice attributes that have an obvious ranking, e.g. if the attributes are different
quality levels along a vertical dimension they are ranked the same way by all
customers. However, this is not always the case with telecommunications. For
instance, not all consumers prefer - at an equal price - to make calls at the same
time of day. Service attributes such as the time-of-day or the node where a call
33A phone call, an e-mail, a web-site etc with an objective to exchange, deliver or gather
information). In this respect telecommunications is very different fromother network industries,
like electricity or water delivery. One kW/h of electricity injected at one point is a perfect
substitute for one kW/h injected at any other point of generation.
34The B-subscriber is the party being called whereas the A-subscriber is the party making
the call.
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terminates are attributes along a horizontal dimension and customers will rank
them differently.
A widespread practice is to offer various kinds of calling circle tariffs. Under a
calling circle tariff, a subscriber is billed according to aggregate minutes (seconds)
of calling to specific B-subscribers (or specific network nodes), and the marginal
price varies conditional on the node of termination. The following model aims at
explaining and guiding the construction of such tariffs.
3.3 A two-dimensional good
Let q be a two-dimensional good q = (n, x), where x is a quantity variable and ti
is a service attribute.i" The vector q tells us how many units (x) with the given
service attribute (n) a consumer did buy. When we sum over all possible service
attributes (i.e., over every possible n) the sum is equal to a consumer's total
demand, i.e., aggregate units of the generic good. This is to collect and sum up
the x's at every point in figure 3.1(a) (or 3.1(b)). Figure 3.1 gives two examples
on representation of q. In the figure, Xa is the number of minutes a high demand
consumer called network node na, and x~ is the number of minutes a low demand
consumer called network node n~. Note that the n-axis merely gives the identity
of the party called (phone numbers) and is not ordered in any sense.
We represent a consumer's purchase set Q by sorting along the attribute di-
mension, and describe this set with a "continuous boundary" x (n). Using the
telephone example again, and saying that the attribute assignment is network
node (B-subscriber), sorting along the attribute dimension gives a presentation
of the most called number, the second most called number, and so on.36 We
introduce heterogeneity on the demand side by assuming that a consumer's will-
ingness to pay for the good is characterized by a privately known parameter B,
measuring the intensity of a consumer's valuation of quantity. A consumer B in-
cludes in his purchase set Q all increments for which his valuation v(q, B) exceeds
the marginal price p charged
Q(B;p) {q:v(q,B)2:p}
- {(n,x):v((n,x),B)2:p}. (3.1)
35A context with multidimensional products is similar to a multiproduct context since units
assigned different sets of attributes can be treated as different products. The distinction be-
tween a multiproduct context and a multidimensional product context is that the consumer is
allowed to custom design the service attributes by assigning each item his preferred attributes
(termination nodejB-subscriber, time of day, day of week etc) instead of choosing between a
fixed and more constrained number of products. See Wilson (1993, part 3) for a description
of multidimensional products and multidimensional pricing and for instance Armstrong (1996)
on multiproduct pricing.
36Sucha presentation is only possible if the service attributes can be interpreted as cardinal
levels and if n is continuous. The various attributes can not be along dimensions such as for
instance color.
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x x
(n~,x~)
n n
(a) High demand consumer (b) Low demand consumer
Figure 3.1: Demand bundles. High demand consumers make calls of longer du-
ration and to a larger number of network subscribers
The boundary around the set given by (3.1) is those points where the marginal
valuation equals the marginal price. Marginal valuation is given by
ånåx'
v((n,x),Ol) < v((n,x),02),when 01 < O2,
v((n,x),O) (3.2)
Type O gains gross utility from consuming the purchase set Q (O; p) given by the
double integral
u (Q (O;p)) = J~ v ((n, x), O)dndx. (3.3)
By saying that the boundary around the set can be represented by a monotonic
function x(n; O,p), which is continuous and everywhere differentiable, we can
derive the demand from consumer type O by solving a single integral over the
attribute dimension. Aggregate demand for the generic good over all possible
attribute levels is given by
Q(p,O) = 100 x(s;O,p)ds, (3.4)
and we define Qi(P) = Q(p, Oi)' i = 1,2. Aggregate demand for the generic good
with attribute level ri or lower, i.e., aggregate calls to the i1. most called network
nodes, is given by
Q (p, O,ri) =1ftX (s; O,p) ds,
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(3.5)
and similarly we define Qi(P, n) = Q(p, Oi,n), i = 1,2. If a consumer can cus-
tomize demand freely, demand is given by (3.4). If he is to choose attribute levels
within the interval [O,n], demand is given by (3.5), and Qi (p) ~ Qi (p, n), i= 1,2.
In the following we assume that x(n;Ol'p) < x(n;02,p), 'Vp,n for Ol < O2 and
also that x (n; O,p) is monotonic. Hence Q2 (p) > Ql (p) and Q2 (p, n) > Ql (p, n) ,
'Vp, n. Further, a. (p, n) is nonincreasing in p and nondecreasing in n, and Qi (p)
is also nonincreasing in p, i = 1,2.
Using telephony as an example, heterogeneity in consumer demand is given
by differences in call duration and call dispersion. We define call dispersion
according to a cumulative distribution Fl (n) ~ F2 (n) with a probability density
function fi (n), i = 1,2.37 Hence, we make the assumption that call dispersion
is independent of the price per call minute and that type 2 has a more dispersed
calling pattern compared to type 1. Since we are only interested in the calls made
by these two consumers, we can without loss of generality normalize the "entire
network" to 1, and say that type 2 always makes calls to the entire network
whereas type 1 has a more concentrated calling pattern.
x X
X2
1(112 IQ2
Xl Xl
IQI IQI
(a) Purchase set (b) Relinquish set
Figure 3.2: Rectangular purchase set (a) and the effect on type 2's purchase set
of a restriction in call dispersion (b)
Figure 3.2 gives an illustration in the case of a rectangular purchase set. With
a rectangular purchase set we have implicitly assumed that t. (n) is uniform on
[0, ni], F; (n) = n/ni (ni = {nI, I}). The height of the rectangle measures the
number of call minutes x to network node n. Type 1 makes calls to nI different
37Thedistribution of n conditional on B2 first-order stochastically dominates the distribution
of n conditional on Bl, if B2 2: Bl. For notation we use ti (n) =: t (n; Bi), F; (n) =: F (n; Bi)
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network nodes, whereas type 2 makes calls to n2 different network nodes, i.e., ni is
a measure of call dispersion. Figure 3.2 above reflects that there is heterogeneity
in both call duration and call dispersion. If Xl = X2 all heterogeneity would be in
call dispersion, whereas nI = n2 would describe a situation with all heterogeneity
in call duration. The shaded area Q~ in figure 3.2 represents the part of type 2's
ideal purchase set that he has to give up if he chooses a tariff with a restriction
in call dispersion nI.
3.4 The model
The market is served by a monopolist and resale opportunities are absent. The
cost function is assumed to be linear, the fixed cost is excluded from the measure
of profit and the marginal cost is normalized to zero. On the demand side there
are only two consumers, type 1 with low willingness to pay and type 2 with high
willingness to pay. A consumer's type is unobservable to the firm but each type's
preferred calling pattern is known. We assume that type 2 has a more dispersed
calling pattern than type 1. The types' call dispersion Ii (n) is exogenous. The
reservation utility is assumed to be equal for the two consumers and normalized
to zero.
Because call dispersion is independent of the marginal price of a call minute,
we can also write consumers' utility as a function independent of call dispersion.
We use the following utility function that is quasilinear and quadratic in X38
o, = { Bix - ~X2 - T if they pay T for x minutes of calling, (3.6)
O if they do not buy.
T is an increasing and continuous price schedule with a constant unit price
p = {Pl,P2}. Given information about each type's call dispersion, we derive
expected call length to a network node ti as (Bi - p) Ii (n). Consumers' demand
is thus given by
Qi (p) - 11(Bi - p) li (n) dn = (Bi - p),
Qi (p, n) - ln (Bi - p) li (n) dn = (Bi - p) F; (n).
The density function Ii is positive and integrable on the support n E [O, 1] with
a distribution function Fi(n) with Fl(n) > F2(n), and fIF2 :S hFl. Aggregate
(3.7)
(3.8)
38Weabstract from the fact that some consumers may have positive utility even in the case
when consumption is zero. A subscriber may want a network connection in order to receive
calls only, or to be able to make emergency calls. Our assumption in this model is that if the
expected net utility from making calls weakly exceeds a consumer's reservation utility he will
find it beneficial to subscribe to the network. By assuming quasilinear utility we also ignore
income effects.
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demand for call minutes to the entire network is given by (3.7) and aggregate
demand for call minutes to the n most frequently called nodes is given by (3.8).
The latter case resembles the first, except that n affects the intercept and the
slope of the individual demand curves. However, these are perfectly (negatively)
correlated and the firm can infer about the slope when it knows the intercept
(and vice-versa). 39
Consumer surplus under a two-part tariff Ti = {Pi, Ei} for some given n ~ 1
is given by
CS; (p;, E;, n) 1~'(8; - p) F; (n) dp - E;, i= 1,2,
CSdp,E,n) > CSdp,E,n).
(3.9)
(3.10)
When both types choose consumption subject to the same tariff, type 2 obtains a
larger surplus given that Fl (n) / F2 (n) ~ ()2/()1. Under this condition the demand
curves of the two types never cross for any price. Since the demand curves are
linear and ()2 ;::: ()l, it is sufficient to evaluate the condition (()2 - p)F2(n) ;:::
(()l - p)FI(n) as P approaches zero.
When we solve the model we proceed in two steps. First, we solve for the
optimal two-part tariffs, Tl intended for type 1 and T2 intended for type 2, treating
n as exogenous. Next, having obtained a reduced form profit as a function of n
we solve for the optimal restriction in call dispersion in the two-part tariffs Tl
and T2.
3.5 Two-part tariffs
Given the slopes of the demand curves and asymmetric information over () the
practice that maximizes profit is to offer different two-part tariffs intended for
the two consumer types. We know equilibrium in this model as a solution where
PI > Oand P2 = c. The fixed fee in type 1's tariff is chosen in such a way that he
receives his reservation utility and the fixed fee in type 2's tariff is chosen such
that type 2 does not choose the tariff intended for type 1. More formally, consider
the model as follows. A two-part tariff is characterized by a triple {Pi, Ei; ni}, Pi is
the marginal price, Ei is a fixed fee and ni ~ 1 is the fraction of the network that
can be reached with the tariff. When the reservation utility is normalized to zero,
it is individually rational to accept any tariff {p, E; ni} that yields nonnegative
consumer surplus. The two individual rationality constraints are
39Laffontet al. (1987) solve for the optimal nonlinear price schedule when a monopolist is
uncertain about both the slopes and the intercepts of the individual demand curves it faces,
assuming a continuum of types and that the distributions of slopes and intercepts are indepen-
dent.
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Since C82(.) > C81(.), IR2 can not bind whenever IRI is weakly met. Hence if
type 1 is served, IRI is the only binding individual rationality constraint. The
other relevant constraints are the incentive compatibility constraints
The incentive constraint requires that a consumer buys the bundle intended for
his type. ICI can never bind if IC2 is weakly met. Hence, the incentive constraint
is downward binding only.j''
It is never profitable to restrict type 2's demand and any restriction in call
dispersion will only occur in the tariff intended for type 1. Henceforth we use the
notations n2 = 1 and nI = n. The firm is searching for two-part tariffs {Pl, El, n}
and {P2, E2, l} - {p2, E2} in order to maximize profit. If the restriction on n is
fixed we have the following maximization problem
(3.11)
subject to Pi 2: 0, Ei 2: ° (i = 1,2), I RI, and IC2
El - l(h (Ol - p) Fl (n) dp,
Pl
E2 = El +c (02 - p) dp -l(h (02 - p) g (n) dp.
P2 Pl
(3.12)
(3.13)
The outcome is unique with PI 2: P2 = 0, and E2 > El, whenever O2 > Ol and
both types are served. The last term in (3.13) illustrates the two instruments that
can be used to reduce the information rent. The firm can increase PI or decrease
n. If the firm chooses not to serve type 1, the unique outcome is a cost-plus-fixed
fee tariff, P2= 0, and the entire consumer surplus is extracted via the fixed fee.
We can now turn to the question of how severe the restriction in call dispersion
in type 1's tariff should be. As a benchmark however, we first repeat the profit
maximizing two-part tariffs in the single-dimensional case with n = 1.
If the firm has no ability to monitor call dispersion, or to condition a tariff
on a restriction in call dispersion, Q is treated as a single dimensional good,
nI = n2 = 1. This is the canonical model with two-types and single-dimensional
screening which is examined in, for instance, Sharkey and Sibley (1993).
Lemma 3.1 (Single-dimensional screening) A monopoly that is unable to
observe anything but individual quantity purchases will increase the unit price in
type 1's tariff above marginal cost in order to reduce the information rent to type
2. If consumer heterogeneity is too large, the monopoly will exclude type 1from
buying.
40See for instance Tirole (1988) pp 153-154, and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pp 247-248.
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(i) For ~ E [1,~] the monopoly will serve both types and offer two different
two-part tariffs {PI, El} and {O, E2} given by
Pl = O2 - Ol, El = ~(201 - (2)2, E2 = ~(2(h - (2)2 + ~ (O~ - OD .
(ii) For ~ > ~ the monopoly will exclude type 1 and offer a cost-plus-fixed-fee
tariff {O, E2} and extract all surplus from type 2. The tariff is given by
E2 = ~O~.
Lemma 3.1 is simple to verify by substituting for FI(n) = F2(n) = 1 in the
above maximization problem (3.11)-(3.13). The information rent to type 2 is
exactly balanced against the gain from serving type 1 when 0dOI = 3/2, i.e.,
type 1 is served only if O2/01 ::; 3/2 (cut-off rate).
Now we turn to the case of a wider strategy set, i.e., where the tariff intended
for type 1 may have a restriction in call dispersion. Type 1 can only reach
a limited number of call termination points (a fraction n of the full network).
According to (3.7) and (3.8) a restriction in call dispersion causes a negative
horizontal shift in the demand curves. Type 2's gross surplus from consuming
the good is evaluated according to type 2's true willingness to pay, Q2(P), while
he is given an information rent as if the heterogeneity was described according to
the demand curves QI(P, n) and Q2(P, n). A distortion in type l's tariff makes it
less tempting for the high demand type to mimic the low demand type. Type 2
is less tempted by type 1's tariff if he cannot reach the entire network and he is
less tempted when the unit price in type l' s tariff is high. Although type 1 also
suffers under such distortions, he is not as seriously affected as type 2. In both
cases the means is to restrict type 2's consumption if he selects type 1's tariff,
by way of a high unit price or access to a smaller network (reduced opportunity
set).
Lemma 3.2 (Two-dimensional screening) If consumers' calling patterns are
type dependent, and can be monitored by the monopoly, a restriction on type 1's
call dispersion serves as an alternative to a distortion in the unit price to type 1.
For a given restriction n, type 2 is offered a cost-plus-fixed-fee tariff {O,E2} and
type 1 is offered a two-part tariff {p~, Er, n}, n ::;1
n Fdn)
Pl = O2 - Ol F
2
(n) ,
and where the fixed fees Er and E2 are determined by (3.12) and (3.13).
Under our assumptions on Fl and F2, p~ is nondecreasing in n, continuous,
and differentiable whenever p~ > O. Because type 2 consumers suffer more both
from a restriction in call dispersion and from an increase in the unit price, they
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serve as alternative instruments to relax the incentive constraint. This is reflected
in the result that p~ is decreased (increased) when n is decreased (increased).
On the other hand, both instruments are costly to use in the sense that type
1's consumption is de facto restricted (whereas type 2's consumption is restricted
only if he opts for type 1's tariff). In either case the consequence is that type
1 will make fewer calls. The firm loses income from these calls and since type 1
loses surplus on these calls he is not willing to participate unless the fixed fee is
reduced. On the other hand, type 1's tariff is no longer as tempting for type 2 and
the fixed fee from type 2 can be increased. The optimal trade-off in the firm's use
of the two instruments depends on the relative effect they have on the two types'
demand. From the pricing rule in Lemma 3.2 we see that larger heterogeneity in
call duration (02 is large relative to Ol) results in a larger unit price.
Assuming that both types are served we use part (i) of Lemma 3.2 and write
the expected profit as a function of n as
{
~O~+ ~Oi?2(~)2 - Fl (n) Ol (02 - Ol) if p~ > 0,
II(n) =
OiFI (n) + ~O~(1 - F2 (n)) if p~ = O.
(3.14)
The firm maximizes profit with respect to n and the tariffs are determined by
Lemma 3.2. If the heterogeneity in quantity type is large relative to the hetero-
geneity in call dispersion, the firm will offer type 1 consumers a two-part tariff
with a restriction in call dispersion together with a distorted unit price. In the
opposite case the firm will offer type 1 consumers flat-rate pricing with restriction
in call dispersion. Whenever there is heterogeneity in the types' calling pattern
the firm will restrict type 1's calling.
Lemma 3.3 (Restriction in call dispersion) The firm separates between high
and low demand consumers by distorting type 1's tariff with respect to call dis-
persion, alone or together with a distortion in the unit price.
(i) Type 1 is offered a cost-plus-fixed-fee tariff with a restriction in call disper-
sion ii E (0,1] if ii exists such that
2!I(n)
h(n)
(ii) Type 1is offered a two-part tariff with a unit price distortion and a restric-
tion in call dispersion fL E (0,1] if fL exists such that
The tariffs are subsequently determined according to Lemma 3.2.
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The firm chooses to place a restriction in call dispersion in order to satisfy the
condition aIT/ an .::;O. The first inequality in part (i) of Lemma 3.3 states the
condition for pf > O,whereas the last inequality in part (ii) of Lemma 3.3 states
the condition for pf = O. In the latter case, the firm only has to trade-off how an
increase in ti affects the fixed fees. Hence, if the heterogeneity in call duration
is low relative to the heterogeneity in call dispersion, type 1 is more likely to be
served with a cost-plus-fixed-fee tariff, i.e., when B2/BI is small and/or Fd F2 is
large. Since the tariff intended for type 2 has no restriction in call dispersion, the
demand curves QI(p,n) and Q2(P) never cross if B2/BI ;:::FI(n), which is always
met. It does not matter whether the demand curve Q2(P, n) crosses QI(P, n) since
type2 is not expected to make his purchases along Q2(P, n).
When call dispersion conditional on consumer type B is known, we can char-
acterize the firm's pricing policy. We do this in the following two sections. For
simplicity we assume that type 2 makes calls of equal length to all nodes, i.e.,
f2(n) is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. Regarding type l's call dis-
persion we assume two different cases, call dispersion is described either by the
uniform distribution or by a Beta distribution.
3.5.1 Uniform distribution
Call dispersion for type 1 is uniformly distributed on the interval [O,fil]' and call
dispersion for type 2 is uniformly distributed on the interval [O,1], O< fil < 1.
The marginal unit price is pf = B2 - Bl;1' For pf > O, the derivative of the
firm's profit with respect to n can be written as
dIT {- 2~2
dn = _Bl (B2 - Bl) + Bi if O< n < fil,
fil 2fii
if fil::; n ::;1,
(3.15)
And if pf = Owe have IT= Er + E~, and the derivative with respect to ti is
dIT {- ~B~ if fil::; n ::;1,
dn = _1Bi - ~B~ if O< ti < fil, (3.16)
nI
The profit function is linear for ti E [O,fil) but the sign of the derivative is
ambiguous, for n E (fil, 1] profit decreases in n. The optimal restriction in call
dispersion will be one of the extremes n* = Oor n* = fil. In the first case type 1
is de facto excluded. Henceforth, we define a variable t = ~. The propositions
that follow describe the monopoly's pricing strategy.
Proposition 3.1 If heterogeneity in call dispersion is sufficiently large relative
to heterogeneity in call duration, n* = fil and type 1 is served with a cost-plus-
fixed-fee tariff {O,Er, fil}' For t E [1,2] this occurs for fil ::; t, for t > 2 it occurs
for fil ::; fr·
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Proposition 3.1 shows that a restriction in call dispersion in type 1's tariff
may be sufficient to separate the types. Consumers with different willingness to
pay are charged identical unit price, but type 2 pays a larger fixed fee. In terms
of pricing, this looks like first degree price discrimination. For t ::; ~, type 1 is
served with a restriction in call dispersion instead of with a distortion in the unit
price, for t > ~, type 1 is served with a restriction in call dispersion instead of
being excluded.
Proposition 3.2 If demand side heterogeneity is more moderate and balanced,
type 1 is served with a two-part tariff {p~, Er, rh}, and p~ > O. This occurs for
nI > 0.5 and t < 2, and t such that ~1 ::; t ::;1 + 2~1 .
A restriction in call dispersion will always be used, either alone (p~ = O) or
in combination with a restriction on usage via distortionary pricing.
Proposition 3.3 If heterogeneity in call duration is sufficiently large relative to
heterogeneity in call dispersion, type 1 is excluded from making purchases. This
occurs Jar t > ~ Jar nI E [0,0.5), or for t > 1+ 2~1 for nI E [0.5,1]. Type
2 is served with a cost-plus-fixed-Jee tariff, {O, E2, I}, which extracts the entire
social surplus. Type 1 is served in more cases relative to the single-dimensional
case.
Although increased heterogeneity in call dispersion reduces the incentive to
exclude type 1, proposition 3.3 states that this incentive still exists." The proofs
of the propositions are given by simple calculations that are shown in the ap-
pendix. Figure 3.3 illustrates the results.
The effect of a reduction in call dispersion is that the firm can give informa-
tional rent to type 2 as if the types were described according to the demand curves
Qi (p, nI), but extract gross surplus from type 2 according to the demand curve
Q2 (p). Typically, the possibility of type 1 being served increases as nI decreases
because this increases the 'observability' of the two types. The generalization of
this is the fact that the firm is always better, or at least equally well, off with an
additional observable and instrument at hand.42
3.5.2 Beta distribution
The Beta-distribution allows for the possibility that the call length may vary
over n, i.e., over points of call termination. That is, call termination points are
4lInstead of saying that n* = Owe could say that n" = 1 but let pr be sufficiently high to
ensure that QI (PI) = O.
42Sappington (1983) shows this in a regulation model. A regulator that is uncertain about
a multiproduct firm's production technology achieves additional information by observing the
production level of each product. Caillaud et al. (1988) generalize the case with several observ-
able variables.
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Figure 3.3: Pricing policy towards type 1 depending on the heterogeneity along
the two dimensions. The larger the heterogeneity in call dispersion (low rh) the
larger is the possibility that type 1 is served and that he is served with an efficient
tariff, i.e., a cost-plus- fixed-fee tariff.
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ordered according to the most called number, the second most called number
etc. We keep the simplification that type 2's calling is uniformly distributed
on [O,1] but say that type 1 has a more concentrated calling pattern by using
the Beta distribution and placing more probability weight to the left tail of the
distribution. Figure 3.4 illustrates this difference between the types.
ri, ri,
(a) Probability density (b) Cumulative density
Figure 3.4: Probability distribution over n, the uniform distribution and the Beta
distribution with v = 1
The probability density function for the beta distribution is
I
nv-l (1 - n)W-l
if 0< n < 1
f(n,v,w) = B(v,w) - - ,
O otherwise.
(3.17)
where the shape parameters v and ware positive numbers. The denominator
B(v, w) is the Beta function. With v = 1, the shape of the distribution is
determined by w, the higher is w the larger is the mass for low n. We can
redefine the distributions for type 1 by fixing v to be 1 and letting w vary (w = 1
is the uniform distribution on [O,1]). The p.d.f and the c.d.f. are defined by
{ w(l- n)w-l ifO:S n:S 1,O otherwise.
{ 1 - (1 - n)W if O :S n :S l.O otherwise.
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(3.18)
(3.19)
The probability density and cumulative density functions h(n) and F2(n) are the
same as before. The firm seeks to maximize profit with respect to n according to
the optimality condition in Lemma 3.3. The monopoly's pricing strategy is given
in the following propositions.
Proposition 3.4 If heterogeneity in call dispersion is sufficiently large relative to
the heterogeneity in call duration, both types are served with a cost-plus-fixed-fee
tariff {O,Ef,n*}, n* E [n',nlf). This occurs for t ::; t'::; tlf. n' tuui n" decrease
whereas t' and tlf increase as the heterogeneity in call dispersion increases (w
increases).
Proposition 3.4 is a replication of proposition 3.1, the larger the heterogeneity
in call dispersion, the more powerful is a restriction in call dispersion as an
instrument to separate the types. This can be utilized by the firm in two different
ways. The firm can achieve less costly separation by decreasing n (reflecting that
n" decreases as w increases), or serve more types (reflecting that tlf increases as
w increases).
Proposition 3.5 When the heterogeneity is more moderate and balanced, type 1
consumers are offered a twa-part tariff {p~, Ef, n**}, p~ > 0, n** E [0, n'). This
occurs for t' ::; t ::; tlf, and w ::;2.
Proposition 3.5 is a replication of 3.2. When the heterogeneity in call duration
increases, it is necessary to increase the restriction in call dispersion in order to
restore incentive compatibility.
Proposition 3.6 If heterogeneity in call duration is sufficiently large relative to
heterogeneity in call dispersion, type 1 is excluded from making purchases. This
occurs for t > v'2W if w < 2 or for t > 1+ ~w if w > 2. Type 1 is served in more
cases relative to the single-dimensional case. If w = 2, then t' = tlf = 2 and all
types that are served are served with a cost-plus-fixed-fee tariff.
Finally, proposition 3.6 is a replication of proposition 3.3. The incentive to
exclude low demand consumers still exists when the heterogeneity in call duration
is sufficiently large. The propositions 3.4,3.5, and 3.6 are proved in the Appendix.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the results.
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n2
Figure 3.5: Pricing policy towards type 1, w = 1.7. The larger the heterogeneity
in call dispersion (high w) the larger is the possibility that type 1 is served and
that he is served with an efficient tariff, i.e., a cost-plus-fixed-fee tariff.
3.6 Concluding remarks
In the model presented in this paper, we have assumed that a monopoly firm
can use two instruments to achieve second-degree price discrimination. The firm
can introduce quantity distortions towards low demand types, according to the
well-known model with nonlinear pricing. Another instrument is to introduce a
restriction on the use of the service in such a way that high demand consumers are
punished more than low demand consumers. The firm typically finds it optimal
to combine distortions along the two dimensions. Then, type 1 consumers face
a two-part tariff with a marginal price above marginal cost, together with a
restriction on usage. However, the restriction on usage allows the firm to reduce
the distortion in the pricing rule in the low-demand type's tariff. Whenever
the monopoly firm finds it profitable to serve type 1 and there is observable
heterogeneity in the use of the service, it will always impose a restriction on usage
in type 1's contract. Sometimes, imposing a restriction on usage is sufficient to
achieve separation. We also show that the results are qualitatively the same in
the case when calls are distributed according to the uniform distribution and the
Beta-distribution.
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The theoretical model contributes to explain the practice of optional tariffs
such as calling circle tariffs, in which the restriction is really severe. However, it
should be remarked that promotion of calling circle tariffs might also serve as a
strategy to create lock-in effects in duopolistic competition.
Further, the model suggests that it might be possible to practice a pricing
strategy closer to fiat rate pricing by separating consumers by other means than
price-cost distortions. Hence, the outcome would be closer to first degree price
discrimination. Although this paper applies the model to a very simple example
within telecoms, the pricing principles derived are of general validity.
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Appendix
A.l Proof of Propositions 3.1-3.3
For pr (rh) 2: O the profit function in (3.15) is increasing in n if
~<l+_l
81 - 2nl· (3.20)
For pr (rh) = O the profit function in (3.16) is increasing in ti if
(3.21 )
The unit price is positive if
(3.22)
Both conditions (3.20) and (3.21) define a curve that is steeper in the (B2/Bl, rh)
space than does the condition pr = o. Also, pr = O and dITI dn = O are binding
jointly for (B2/BlJh) = (2, ~). The slopes are given by the following
drh I -2
d (B2/Bl) Pl'=O = -nIl
(3.23)
(3.24)
Proposition 3.1 is derived by solving for rh in (3.22) (or (3.21)) respectively for
t < (»2. Proposition 3.2 is simply given by (3.20) and (3.22). Proposition 3.3
is derived by turning the inequality in (3.20) for rh E [0,0.5), and by turning the
inequality in (3.21) for rh E [0.5,1). Since limnl-+l(l + 2~)= ~,type 1 is served
in more cases relative to the single-dimensional case.
A.2 Proof of Propositions 3.4-3.6
From Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 we derive the conditions pr = O and IT~ = O,
which are the two curves in figure 3.5. The slopes of these are given by
dnl
dt Pl'=O
n2
---<O,
nfI - Fl - (3.25)
dnl
dt II'-On-
fiK <o
fIn - if pr = O,
2n3j2
---,--:-- _ ___.,:.~1_--;:-2- < O if pr > o,
2!1(n!1-Fl)2+nFlfIn -
(3.26)
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with notation !In - djl (n, w) / dn, !Iw - d!I (n, w) / dw and so on.
When w increases there will be a positive shift in the curve defining PI = o,
!!!_I = Flw > O.
dw pf=O n-
(3.27)
The shift in the curve defining n~= O is negative for larger values of nand
positive for smaller values of ti,
dt I -
dw rr~=o
if PI = o.
(3.28)
When w increases it places more probability weight to the lower end. Hence, !Iw
is positive for smaller values of ti and negative for higher values of n, while !In is
negative for all ti E [0,1].
Next, we evaluate the shift along the t-axis
{
l if Pl = O,
limn~o+ [:: I~J~ ~ if PI > O. (3.29)
Hence, since the shift is positive along the t-axis, the shift along the n-axis must
be negative, implying that til is increasing and nil is decreasing in w.
We can show that n' decreases when the heterogeneity in call dispersion increases
by differentiating the condition
(3.30)
which gives us
dn'
dw
(3.31)
Since we have t' = H(~:,w),which is monotonic with dt' / dn' < O (by 3.25), t' is
increasing in w. By inspection we can conclude that the firm offers a cost-plus-
fixed-fee tariff for t < t' and n > n'. This completes the proof of Propositions 3.4
and 3.5
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When w = 2 the curves are tangent at the point (t, n) = (2, O) and ti = til
. [Fl] (3.32)lzmn-+o+ -;: - w,
limn-+o+ [J2hl J2;, (3.33)
[ Fl ( 1Fl) l 1 (3.34)limn-+o+ 1+ -;: 1- "2 h 1+-.2w
The shift in the curve defining p~ = Oalong the t-axis is given by
(3.35)
The shift in (3.35) is larger than (3.29). Since w > 1 type 1 is for certain served
when t < 3/2. Together with the preceding statements this completes the proof
of Proposition 3.6.
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Chapter 4
Three-Part Tariffs in a Duopoly
by Sissel Jensen *
4.1 Introduction
We observe nonlinear pricing in many markets, that is, pncmg arrangements
where payment is not strictly proportional to the quantity of purchases. In the
literature, implementation of nonlinear pricing is typically studied as a single
two-part tariff or as a menu of two-part tariffs. Further, with a few notable ex-
ceptions, the existing literature applies a setting with a monopoly firm where
nonlinear pricing is implemented by two-part tariffs. However, it is easy to verify
that this does not sufficiently describe the practice of nonlinear pricing. Firstly,
nonlinear pricing is a common practice in duopoly and oligopoly markets as well
as in monopolies. Secondly, we frequently observe that other tariff arrangements
rather than just two-part tariffs are used. The purpose of this paper is to make
a contribution in the second part of the gap between theory and practice within
the field of nonlinear pricing. We examine whether the fact that there is com-
petition between two firms instead of a monopoly significantly changes the tariff
structure. We find that implementation by two-part tariffs may not be a feasible
strategy in a duopoly, but if a firm can use a combination of two-part and three-
part tariffs, a fully nonlinear pricing schedule can be implemented. Three-part
tariffs are used for small quantity purchases while two-part tariffs are used for
large quantity purchases. Furthermore, quantity discounts are given for larger
*1 am indebted to Øystein Foros, Kåre Petter Hagen, Bjørn Hansen, Petter Osmundsen,
Atle Seierstad, Knut Sydsæter , Lars Sørgard, Steinar Vagstad, Jon Vislie, and two anonymous
referee for their helpful comments. 1have also benefited from comments of seminar participants
at the University of Bergen, and at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Adminis-
tration. 1 also thank Marit Hareland and Hans Olav Husum for contributions in the discussion
of this problem at an early stage.
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purchases only. Finally we show that this is in fact what firms actually do in the
telecommunications market, where we observe competition rather than monopoly.
The market perception of what are reasonable tariff structures would vary
according to what kind of market one is studying. However, menus of two-part
and three-part tariffs are frequently used and it seems natural to restrict the
analysis to menus of piecewise linear tariffs. A firm confronts consumers with a
menu of tariffs and consumers make their optimal quantity choice subject to the
tariff chosen and are also billed according to this tariff. Under two-part tariffs
consumers receive larger quantity discounts if they are willing to pay a larger
fixed fee in advance. Three-part tariffs can be implemented in two different
ways; Consumers may commit to a specific minimum usage level and pay a fiat
fee until this level is reached. The higher the minimum usage consumers commit
to the higher discount they get. Another way to implement a three-part tariff
is to apply larger discounts when realized usage exceeds some specific threshold
level during a billing period.
4.1.1 Related literature
In a monopoly context models on optimal nonlinear pricing often assume that it
is sufficient to ensure that the individual rationality constraint is satisfied for the
worst type only. If the worst type finds it weakly rational to participate, then all
types will indeed participate. Under the monotone hazard rate condition, a menu
of two-part tariffs is sufficient to implement a fully nonlinear outlay schedule with
complete separation of types. The underlying assumptions behind this result are
that the agent's participation decision is deterministic; the reservation utility is
independent of consumer type and the private information is single-dimensional.
There is an increasing amount of literature that explores how the weakening of
the modelling assumptions affects the results. Within the part of incentive theory
where an agent contracts with only one principal, i.e., models with only a single
principal or models with delegated common agency, richer models incorporate ei-
ther multi-dimensional types or type-dependent participation constraints. Rochet
and Stole (2000) give a review of the literature on multidimensional screening.
Several papers have incorporated nonlinear pricing into models with imperfect
competition, but few study tariff design and tariff implementation under asym-
metric information about individual quantity-type. The papers by Stole (1995),
Armstrong and Vickers (1999) and Rochet and Stole (1999) model nonlinear pric-
ing in a differentiated oligopoly. In Stole's paper the qualitative property of the
monopoly model with downward distortion for all types but the highest is kept,
while Rochet and Stole (1999) and Armstrong and Vickers (1999) find conditions
that imply that efficient two-part tariffs emerge as an equilibrium. The diver-
gence between these two results is partly relying on how transportation costs
enter the model. In Stole's model transportation costs depend on the quantities
consumed (and on taste) whereas the transportation costs are assumed to be
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lump-sum costs in the two others. However, Stole (1995) leaves the question of
implementation aside.43 Other papers that study two-part tariffs under compe-
tition often do this in a Cournot or Bertrand game, but with focus on two-part
tariffs versus linear tariffs rather than on how the informational problem affects
the tariff design.t"
There is literature that deals with multi-dimensional screening where the in-
formational asymmetry relates directly to the variable being contracted upon
(e.g., consumers' willingness to pay for different quality attributes, or an agent's
efficiency type when performing different tasks for a principal). The work by
Armstrong and Rochet (1999), Rochet and Chene (1998) provides an overview
of the literature and represents the status on how far the techniques are devel-
oped." Another view on multi-dimensionality in mechanism design is taken in
Rochet and Stole (1999), who work on a general model of nonlinear pricing where
the informational asymmetry is present in the consumers' reservation utility as
well as in their preferences, i.e., with a more general modelling of the partici-
pation decision. The methodology developed in Rochet and Stole (1999) paper
with randomness in the agents' outside option fits a situation where consumers'
location is not perfectly known. They demonstrate the difficulties of working on
multidimensional problems.
The literature on type-dependent participation constraint includes the work
by Lewis and Sappington (1989), Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1993), Ivaldi and Marti-
mort (1994), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), Stole (1995) and Jullien (2000).
Type-dependent participation constraint may arise in a situation with multi-
ple principals (but where an agent contracts exclusively with one of them e.g.,
Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1993), Stole (1995)) or it can arise because of other rea-
sons, i.e., it is for some reasons natural to model a type's outside option as
a function of the privately known type parameter (e.g., Lewis and Sappington
(1989)).46 Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) provide empirical research that support
that nonlinear pricing prevail under oligopolistic competition (energy distribu-
tion). Equilibrium pricing schemes are concave and depend on unknown private
valuation and on the rivals contract parameters. They restrict the regression of
payments to second-order polynomials on quantities. Hence, we cannot rule out
43Valletti (1999) derives similar results in a model with discrete types.
44Examplesof such work are Calem and Spulber (1984), Gasmi et al. (2000), Hayes (1987),
Oren et al. (1983). Wilson (1993) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature and the
practice of nonlinear pricing, Michell and Vogelsang (1991) provide a survey of the pricing
of telecommunications in the U.S. during the 70s and 80s. Stole (1995) also provide a brief
overviewof the literature.
45Literature includes Laffont et al. (1987), Matthews and Moore (1987), Wilson (1993),
Armstrong (1996).
46Modelson common agency can be found in Stole (1992), Martimort (1992), Martimort
(1996), Mezzetti (1997) and Olsen and Osmundsen (1998). These are cases describing a situa-
tion where each principal requires that a task be performed by a common agent. The agent's
ability or effort in performing the two tasks is unobservable but is privately known by the agent.
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a hypothesis that the true outlay schedule has convex parts, although the overall
shape is concave.
Insights from these papers show that many of the results achieved earlier in
nonlinear pricing are not robust. In models with multi-dimensional screening it
is shown that the "no distortion at the top" result may appear together with
distortion, no distortion or bunching at the bottom, as opposed to the Mussa
and Rosen (1978) result with downward distortions for all types except the high-
est. The literature on type-dependent participation constraints demonstrates the
possibility of a non-monotonic informational rent, i.e., countervailing incentives
may arise. The incentive constraint can be downward binding for some types and
upward binding for other types.
The model presented in this paper falls into a situation with asymmetric
information along a single (vertical) dimension and with a type-dependent par-
ticipation constraint. The basic model is identical to the model in Stole (1995).
But, while he solves for an equilibrium in fully nonlinear tariffs, the model we
present here searches for an implementable tariff structure. Further, given the
difficulties of involving multidimensional screening, we keep the assumption that
the agent 's participation decision is deterministic. There are no gains from joint
consumption and this eliminates the "competitive externality" in the incentive
constraint and one source of countervailing incentives." The informational rent
on the other hand has to be evaluated net of an outside option, which is the
maximal utility a consumer gains if he rejects the firm's contract. Generally, it is
not sufficient to ensure that the individual rationality constraint is satisfied for
the worst type only. A priori, the sign of the marginal information rent can be
positive, zero, negative or even change sign over the type space, creating a second
source of countervailing incentives.t'' Countervailing incentives do not occur in
this model, the participation constraint is binding only in the lower part of the
distribution of types (or maybe only for the very lowest type) and the information
rent is strictly increasing elsewhere.
4.2 The model
The model is closely related to Stole (1995). However, the focus is distinctly
different from his. The main issue in this paper is implementation of nonlinear
prices, an issue not raised in Stole (1995). While Stole in his paper lets consumers
buy a single unit of a good but with variable quality, the present paper sets up the
alternative quantity framework. However, impose the restriction that a consumer
47A competitive externality exists when the utility from buying q units from firm Ois evalu-
ated net of the (foregone) utility from not buying the same amount of q from another firm. This
will be similar to the models in Lewis and Sappington (1989) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
(1995).
48This will be similar to the models in Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1993) and Jullien (2000).
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must choose a single tariff. Hence, we exclude the possibility that consumers buy
from both firms, and we also exclude the possibility that consumers choose more
than one tariff as well.49
The model describes a case where two firms, denoted by firm O and firm 1,
offer one product each and the products are spatially differentiated. The firms
are located at the two extremes on a line of length 1, firm O at extreme O and
firm 1 at the other extreme, 1. Each individual's preferences over the two firms
are identified according to each individual's location "f E [O,1] on the interval,
referred to as brand preference. Totallength of the distance between a consumer
and firms O and 1 is 10 - "fl and 11 - "fl respectively. Transportation costs are
normalized to unit, hence, the total loss from not being able to buy the ideally
preferred product is "t and (1 - "f). Brand preferences are common knowledge
and firms practice first-degree price discrimination over the horizontal dimension.
Both firms face constant and identical marginal costs, Co (q) = Cl (q) - c.
Consumers' taste varies over a vertical dimension, which we interpret as a
quantity-preference parameter, referred to as quantity-type (B) subject to private
knowledge.P" The firms have common prior beliefs about the distribution of types
B E [~, OJ described by a cumulative distribution function F(B). The correspond-
ing density function f(B) is strictly positive on the support. Thus, F(B) is the
objective distribution over a population of buyers having identical brand prefer-
ences "f. 51 We will assume that the distribution satisfies the monotone hazard
rate condition.
The first assumption, i.e. about product differentiation, can be justified by
considering that identical services - with respect to the communication capabili-
ties they provide - are sold or bundled with different ancillary services or quality
levels that consumers value differently. This could for example be differences
in billing features (more detailed billing) and in support services, but it could
also be features perceived as differences in the quality of the service provided.F
49This is a simplification to keep the similarity to Stole's model. As pointed out by Stole
(1995) it is plausible to restrict a consumer to purchasing from a single firm under the quality
framework with unit demand. In the alternative quantity framework it requires additional
technical restrictions to ensure that a consumer is not better off by buying two times q/2
than one time q. The restriction we impose on consumers' behavior is for instance plausible
when we think of telephony, or the mobile phone, industry, where consumers subscribe to a
particular tariff option. If they subscribe to more than one option they must also have more
than one phone number, which is by most people regarded as undesirable. If this restriction is
binding, it indicates that the quantity-quality framework are not as intimately related in the
duopoly as in the monopoly framework and that one should be more careful in the modelling
and interpretations.
50Sinceboth O and "( are taken to be continuous, we drop all subscripts for location and
consumers' quantity type throughout the paper. However,we use superscript Oand 1 to denote
the location of the two firms.
51Thedistribution over quantity-types O is independent of "(, i.e., for each "(-valuethe corre-
sponding density function f (O I "() == f (O) for all possible "(E [0,1].
52Examples on differences in quality may be found in AT&T marketing of "AT&T True
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The second assumption can be rationalized by taking into account the fact that
consumers have different needs for communication, e.g. residential and business
customers.
Consumers' preferences are represented by a utility function u (q, O, ,) and
u (q, 0,1 - ,) when he buys from firm Oand 1 respectively. If a consumer buys a
quantity q and pays an amount T, his net utility is U = u (q, O,,) - T.
Assumption 4.1 The utility function is at least three times continuously differ-
entiable and strictly concave in q. We make the following assumptions about the
derivatives of the utility functions u (q, O,,) and u (q, O,1- ,)
(a) u(O, O,·) = O (e) uqo (.) > O
(b) limq->ouq (q, O, .) = 00 (f) Uoo (.) :::;O
(c) limq->ooUq (q, O, .) = O (g) U-y (q, O, ,) < O
(d) Uo (.) > O (h) u-y (q, O, 1 - ,) > O
To satisfy sufficient conditions, we will also make assumptions about the third
order derivatives, and say that UOqq :::;Oand that uooq :::;O. Further, we will make
use of the following definition on consumers' indirect utility
Definition 4.1 Let Uk (O, .) be the net utility (surplus) for a consumer located at
"t with quantity type parameter O when he is faced with a general price schedule
Tk (qk) and buys firm k 's product. The surplus he obtains is
(a) UO(O, ,) = maxq {u(q, O, ,) - TO(q)}
(b) U1(O,1 - ,) _ max, {u(q, 0,1 - ,) - T1(q)}
where Tk (q) is a general price schedule (k = O, 1).
Assumptions 4.1(a)-(c) secure the existence of a unique solution in consumers'
choice of consumption qk as long as there exists a continuous and appropriate
outlay schedule T(q).
The necessary single crossing condition together with assumption 4.1(d), im-
plies that the indifference curves of consumers with different quantity preferences
cross at most once, l.e., assumption 4.1(e). High-quantity type consumers value
a marginal quantity increase higher than low-quantity types, regardless of brand
preferences. Assumptions 4.1(g)-(h) follow from the fact that the products are
horizontally differentiated.
In a first-best situation consumers would be confronted with prices equal to
marginal cost, and under our assumptions this yields unique quantity allocations
and consumer surplus.
Voice". Examples on differences in billing features can be many. Telecom companies undertake
large investments to be able to support detailed billing towards business consumers. This can
be to break down the cost of telecommunications to different business departments, and/or to
different services (fixed link communications, mobile communications, 800-services (Premium
Rate Services), etc.
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Definition 4.2 The first-best quantity levelqk (k = 0,1) is the optimal quantity
purchase when consumers buy at marginal cost and the corresponding utility, de-
noted as first best utility, is given by
(a) qk (O,·) = argmaxqk {U(qk, O,·) - Cqk}, k = 0,1
(b) UO(O, ')') = u(qo(O, ')'), 0, ')') - cqo(O, ')') > °
(e) U1(O, l - ')') = U(q1 (0,1 - ')'),0,1 - ')') - cqo(O, 1 - ')') > O.
It follows from assumptions 4.1 that the first-best quantity and utility, ij(O,·)
and Uk (0, .) are both increasing in O.
The two firms' products are perfect substitutes, except that they are of dif-
ferent brands. There are no gains from joint consumption (i.e., utility is not
subadditive), and, for ° < ')' < 1/2, the gains from purchasing good q1 in addi-
tion to qo will never exceed the surplus from purchasing good qo. The implication
of this is that the quantity purchases of qo are always largest when qo are bought
alone. The opposite apply for 1/2 < ')'< 1
According to assumption 4.1(g), if a consumer chooses to purchase the good
from firm 0, utility is decreasing in location, u"f(qo, 0, ')') < O. Hence, buying from
the closest firm will always give largest first best utility. For all parameter values
0, "t E [ft, OJ x [0,1/2) we have that UO (0, ')') is strictly larger than Ul (0, 1 - ')')
We will also assume that the first-best utility is convex
k = 0, 1. (4.1)
With such characterizations of consumers' preferences, the firm located at °
has a competitive advantage in serving consumers located in the interval [0,1/2],
whereas the firm located at 1 has a competitive advantage in the interval [1/2, 1].
Also, with symmetric marginal costs, price competition between the two firms will
force the fixed fee down to zero and the marginal price down to marginal cost
toward consumers being indifferent between buying from firms ° and 1. Also,
it is an equilibrium strategy for firm 1 to offer marginal cost pricing towards
every consumer located in the interval [0,1/2]. The problem is solved within
a framework where an agent contracts with a single principal, the other firm's
presence does only affect the individual rationality constraint.
At stage one of the game, each firm offers a fully nonlinear tariff with an
ordered pair of take-it-or-leave-it contracts. At stage two, consumers make a
choice of whether to buy from firm ° or 1 (or from none) and also a choice of
qk (k = 0,1). This is equivalent to assuming that the firm announces a menu
of distinct tariffs at stage one, and letting consumers choose a tariff from this
menu at stage two. Then, formally there is a stage three where consumers decide
on individual quantity purchase and are billed according to the tariff choice at
stage two. As long as the tariffs considered in the second type of game truthfully
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implement the fully nonlinear tariff in the first game, the two formulations yield
identical equilibria. Formally, the solution to the first game is analyzed in section
3, whereas section 4 characterizes the set of tariffs that truthfully implement this
solution.
In the game, the firms implement their contracts subject to the incentive com-
patibility and individual rationality constraints. The consumers' choice of firm
and quantity is de facto equivalent to announcing a type, which is in line with
traditional mechanism-design. Further, since marginal-cost pricing is the single
offer from firm 1 inside firm O's turf (for '"'(E [0,1/2]), it is only necessary to secure
truth-telling mechanisms in a single-dimensional space. That is, we can ignore
the complications of a common agency case, in which an agent might misreport
his type differently to the two principals. Therefore, we can solve the delegated
problem as if it is a single-principal case. Under the single crossing condition,
monotoni city is sufficient for local- and global second-order conditions to be sat-
isfied under quasi-linear preferences (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), theorem 7.1
and 7.2).
4.2.1 Individual rationality
As a consequence of the existence of a competing firm, consumers in firm O's
turf [0,1/2] have an outside option. The reservation utility is defined as the
maximum utility obtained by not purchasing, which is normalized to zero, and
the utility from buying the less preferred good. The latter was in the previous
section termed U1(O, 1 - '"'().
Lemma 4.1 The individual rationality constraint is given by
UD(O, '"'() ~ max {U l (O, 1 - '"'(),O} . (4.2)
The proof of Lemma 4.1 is standard, see for example Fudenberg and Tirole (1991,
chapter 7).
Thus, given that the other firm practices marginal cost pricing within firm O's
turf, the individual rationality constraint is a function of consumer type.
Furthermore, since an outside option is of higher valuation for more distant
consumers (closer to 1/2), the individual rationality constraint will differ accord-
ing to consumers' preferences over the two firms' goods. Generally, the value
of the outside option is increasing and convex in O, since the first-best utility is
increasing and is assumed to be convex in O. From (4.2) we also observe that if
'"'(= 1/2, the only way to fulfill the JR constraint is to offer marginal cost pricing.
Otherwise the firms have some market power in their respective market turfs.
4.2.2 Incentive compatibility
Consumers choose contracts that maximize their net utility. Under a direct-
revelation mechanism approach, a consumer of type O maximizes utility with
64
respect to a type announcement ø'. By definition
UO(Ø, Ø', ')') = U( q( Ø', ')'), ø; ')') - t( Ø', ')'),
UO(Ø, ø, ')') = UO(Ø, ')').
(4.3)
(4.4)
Global incentive compatibility requires
(4.5)
Hence
UO(Ø, ')') = U(q(Ø, ')'), ø, ')') - t(Ø, ')'),
=m~{ u(q(Ø', ')'), ø, ')') - t(Ø', ')')}.e
(4.6)
Lemma 4.2 Under the condition of Single Crossing, uqe(·) > O, necessary and
sufficient conditions for global incentive compatibility are given by
aUO(ø, ')')
aø = Ue(qo, ø, ')'),
qo(ø, ')') nondecreasing.
(4.7)
(4.8)
The proof of Lemma 4.2 is also standard and is omitted.P
Hence, (4.2), (4.7) and (4.8) are necessary and sufficient conditions for imple-
mentation. As is usual in the literature, we will ignore (4.8) at the first stage but
subsequently check that it is met.
4.2.3 Informational rents
Before we proceed it might be convenient to determine the sign on the marginal
informational rent to a type ø consumer that truthfully reveal his type.
Lemma 4.3 A consumer of type ø that buys exclusively from firm O, receives an
informational rent
R (Ø, ')') = UO (Ø, ')') - Ul (Ø, 1 -')') ~ O,
aR (Ø, ')') _
aø = Ue (q, ø, ')') - Ue (ql (Ø, 1 -')'), ø, 1 -')') ~ O.
(4.9)
(4.10)
When the informational rent is unambiguously increasing in type, we can rule
out the presence of countervailing incentives. To see that this is the case consider
the following reasoning. When the JR constraint is binding in a neighborhood of
+theia, we have R (Ø, ')') = Oand R~= O. Choosing among the possible solutions
53When the Single Crossing condition is satisfied, local (adjacent) incentive compatibility is
also sufficient for global incentive compatibility. See for instance Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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in q that meets (4.10) (if more than one exist) we select the schedule that also
satisfy (4.6). Hence, (4.10) determine a quantity schedule q (O, ,) = ij (O, I)'
Hence, if the JR constraint is not binding, we must follow a quantity schedule
satisfying the condition q (O, ,) > ij (O, ,). Consequently, since uOq (.) > O the
information rent is nondecreasing in O, and R~ 2: O. When the derivatives with
respect to O and the quantity schedule in the equilibrium are continuous, the JR
constraint can only be binding in the left part of the distribution over O, (or for
fl only), i.e., UD (fl, ,) = Ul (0,1 - ,) and UD (e, ,) is free. Note as well that it is
sufficient to check whether ij (O, ,) is nondecreasing.
Without loss of generality we normalize the value of an outside option to
zero for the lowest type, i.e., Ul (fl, 1 - ,) = O (in practical terms we subtract
this constant from Ul (O, 1 - ,), which is assumed to be positive). We make the
following redefinition of the outside option
(4.11)
The justification behind doing so is that the individual rationality constraint is
binding for the lowest type. Secondly, in this setting we can also compare the
strategies of implementing in the duopoly solution and the monopoly solution
respectively. In the latter, the value of an outside option is normalized to zero
for the lowest type, and for every other type as well.54 If the reservation utility
profile is implementable, i.e., if q is nondecreasing when consumers receive their
reservation utility, it might be the case that the individual rationality constraint
binds for several types at the low end of the type space.
4.3 Optimal allocations
Firm a's objective is to maximize profit subject to the individual rationality
constraint and the (downward binding) incentive constraint. Profit maximization
is a separate problem for each, E [0,1/2]. The objective is
Max l [t (O, 'Y) - cq (O, 'Y)] f (O) dO
s.t. JR and TC.
(4.12)
We use optimal control to solve the problem, imposing only the first order condi-
tion for incentive compatibility at the first stage (4.8). When we know the sign
of the information rent, we are able to state the initial and terminal values of the
state variable UD. From now and onwards, we drop the subscript on q, since the
54See also Jullien (2000). If all types are served, the globallevel of the reservation utility does
not really matters, what matter is the slope of reservation utility. If u» (B, ,) is the solution to
the problem when the reservation utility is UO, then u» (B,,) +c is the solution to the problem
when the reservation utility is UO + c for any constant c.
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only q we are talking about is qo except when we denote the quantity level in the
outside option (i! = q. The objective is
max rO [u (q, e, ,) - UO - cq] f(e)de
q~O Jf!_
(4.13)
subject to
aua /ae = Ue (q, e, ,) (a.e.),
° ° (- )U (fl, ,) = O, U e" free,
UO (e, ,) 2: Ul (e, 1-,),
ve E [fl, OJ .
q is the control variable and UO is the state variable. This is a control problem
with a pure state constraint.P"
The Lagrangian or generalized Hamiltonian L is
L = [u (q, e. ,) - UO - cq] f (e)
+ A (e) Ue (q, e, ,) + JL (e) [UO - Ul] ,
where L = L (e, q, ir, A, JL) = H (e, q", UO, A) + JL [UO - Ul]. The costate
variable is A( e) and JL( e) is the multiplier of the state constraint. The Hamiltonian
H (e, q, Uo* (e, ,) , A (e)) is strictly concave in q and the maximized Hamiltonian,
il (e, o». A (e)) = maxq~OH (e, q, ir,A (e)) is concave in UO (e, I)' In addition
the state constraint is quasiconcave in UO• 56
Let (q* (e, ,), ti» (e, I)) be an admissible pair in the problem (4.13). Further,
we assume that there exists a continuous function A (e) (::; O), with a piecewise
continuous derivative A' (e), and a piecewise continuous function JL (e) 2: O in
the interval [fl, Ø) Then, we can use the Arrow sufficiency theorem to state the
following additional conditions for a solution to the problem''"
(4.14)
(uq - c) f (e) + A (e) Ueq (q, e, ,) = O,
aL
aA(e)/ae = - aua = f (e) - JL (e),
A (O) = O
(4.15)
(4.16)
(4.17)
55SeeSeierstad and Sydsæter (1977) and Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987) for a treatment on
optimal control theory with mixed and pure state constraint.
56Although "I is certainly an argument in the H and L functions, the parameter is omitted
in the writing of these functions as well as the >. and IL functions in order to make the notation
easier. As long as O~ "I ~ 1/2, the value of "I has only the effect of shifting the level of the
outcome whereas the characterization of the outcome remains the same regardless of "I.
57SeeSeierstad and Sydsæter (1977, theorem 7 p. 377) and Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987,
chapter 5)
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8UD(e, 'Y)/8e = Uo (q, e, 'Y),
. II (e) [UD - Ul] = O, II (e) ? O, [UD - Ul] ? O,
(4.18)
(4.19)
A configuration (UD(e, 'Y), q(e, 'Y), A(e), lI(e)) that satisfies (4.15) - (4.19),
UD(e, 'Y), q(e, 'Y) and A(e) being continuous and piecewise differentiable, lI(e)
piecewise continuous, is also an optimum. In addition we have to allow for op-
timal configurations in which A( e) is only piecewise continuous and has a finite
number of jumps in the domain over e. Under such circumstances we must apply
the additional condition
A (ei) - A (et) = {J(ato (UD - Ul)) = {J,
{J ? O (= O if UD > U l),
(4.20)
(4.21)
where fl < el < ... < ek ::; B are the discontinuity points of A (e), and {J is a
positive number. Since the jump must be from above (A (e-) - A (e+) ? O) we
can rule out the case that there is a jump at e = B, measured by A (e-) - A (B) =
A (e-) ? o. If we allow A (e-) to be positive it implies that firm O sells its'
product at a price below marginal cost, since A (e) = - [(uq - c) f (e)] /UOq• But
under the assumption that the firms are symmetric with respect to marginal cost
the individual rationality constraint can never impose such a strategy. If the JR
constraint stops binding for some e < B, conditions (4.20)-(4.21) apply (Seierstad
and Sydsæter (1987, theorem 8, p. 380 )). Because R~ ? O this leaves only
one possible discontinuity point, the point where the state constraint stops being
binding. If we find a solution with a continuous A (e) we focus on this and do not
elaborate further on solutions where A (e) is not continuous.
First, from the optimality condition (4.15) the distortion is proportional to
A (e), which is necessarily negative since setting a price below marginal cost can
never be a part of the equilibrium strategy.
By differentiating the optimality condition with respect to e we obtain the
following condition for the monotonicity constraint to be met
dq = _uqo(f(e) + A') + (uq - c)f'(e) + AUqoo > o.
de uqqf(e) + AUqqO - (4.22)
The denominator is negative under the assumption that the Hamiltonian
H(e, q, uD*(e, 'Y), A(e)) is strictly concave in q. The likelihood of dq/de being
positive increases as the slope of A(e) increases. When A'(e) is negative, there
is a chance that the numerator becomes negative. Note that if we assume that
third derivatives are indeed small, the slope of A (e) rather than A (e) itself will
be important in the monotonicity constraint. Generally, we need
f(e) + A' (e) ? - [(Uq - c) f'(e) + AUqOO].
Uq(} UqO
(4.23)
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When third derivatives are zero and O is uniformly distributed so f' (O) = O,
the condition can .be reduced to
A' (O) ~ - f (O) . (4.24)
If the JR constraint does not bind, the costate equation states that A' (O) is equal
to f(O) and the monotonicity condition is met when I-l (O) = O. On the other
hand, if the JR constraint is binding we have A' (O) = f (O) -I-l (O), I-l (O) ~ O, and
therefore f (O) ~ A' (O). Hence a necessary condition for monotonicity is
f (O) ~ A' (O) ~ - [f (O) + {(Uq - c) f'(O) + A (O) uq(}(} }].
uq(} uq(}
(4.25)
Although we will check whether the candidate for a quantity schedule meets
the monotonicity constraint, we can tell by now that there is a fairly good chance
that it does. The expression in the bracket parenthesis is zero or positive so the
condition expresses that the marginal distortions when the JR constraint bind
can be more than opposite the marginal distortions when the constraint is not
binding.
4.3.1 The IR constraint is not binding
Since A is continuous at 7J we can integrate up the costate equation (4.16), which
gives us ). (O) = - (l - F (O)) = A as a candidate for A (O).
A candidate solution for ij = q (O, "/) determined by (4.15) is given by
(AO) 1-F(O) (AO)uq q, ,,,/ = c+ f(O) u(}q q, ,,,/.
This is the schedule we know from a monopoly nonlinear pricing problem.
Onwards the notation is simplified by writing the accent (e.g. bar, hat, or
tilde) on the symbol for the function to denote that the function is to be evaluated
at a point where q (O, ,,/) has the relevant accent. Henceforth, U = U (ij, O, ,,/), 'il =
u ("ii, O, ,,/), and u = u (ii, O, "/). We can then write the slope of the quantity
schedule as
(4.26)
åij = (uq - c) H' - u(}(}q +H uq(} > O
åO -[H Uqq - u(}qq] -,
f (O)
H = l - F(O)'
(4.27)
Together with assumptions 4.1, when the hazard rate H is increasing in O, the
Hamiltonian H(O,q, Uo*(O,,,/), A(O)) is strictly concave in q, åij/ åO must be pos-
itive since our assumptions guarantee that both the numerator and the denomi-
nator is positive.
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4.3.2 The IR constraint binds
Since the nonnegativity constraint is binding, we have aua Iao = aul lao, which
implies that a candidate for q (O, /,) is given by
U(} (ij, O, /,) = U(} (ih, 0,1 - /') . (4.28)
Let (4.28) determine ij (O, /,), and let (4.15) define a solution to). (O). The solution
in fJ (O) is determined by the costate equation.
Differentiating (4.28) yields a solution to aijl ao
u(}q (ih, O, 1 - /,) ~~ + U(}(} (iiI, O, 1 - /,) = u(}q (ij, O, /,) ~!+ u(}(} (ij, O, /,) ,
and by Definition 4.2(a)
aiiI = _uq(} > O
ao Uqq - ,
(4.29)
so
(Uq(})2 [- _]
aq- -_- - U(}(} - U(}(}-Uqq
ao - --.!..!-.,-------u(}q
For ij (O) to be an increasing function it is necessary that
(4.30)
(4.31)
Because the expression in the bracket is in fact a2 Ul Iao2 and Ul is convex, the
condition is certainly met when u(}(} ~ O.
Last, the JR constraint binds in the interval [fl, Ol] where Ol is the solution in
O to the equation {j (O, /,) = ij (O, /,) (or equivalently ~ (O) = ). (O)), or Ol = fl if
a solution in O to {j (O, /,) = ij (O, /') fails to exist (we can determine Ol this way
only because we have assumed that A (O) is continuous). 58
The optimal allocation can now be characterized. Quantity-outlay allocations
are described by the following characteristics (Stole, 1995)
*(0 ) _ {ij(O,/,) if OE [fl,OI]
q ,/, - {j (O, /,) if O E [Ol, OJ '
Ol = {O: ij (O, /,) = {j (O, /'n,
(4.32)
(4.33)
58Using the fact that >.~= f (B) - J-l (B), J-l ::::: Ocould lead us to the same conclusion. For
B = 71,>'(71)- >'(71)< Osince we cannot have a jump at the right end of the distribution. Since
J-l is positive if I R binds, we must have f (B) :::::>.~. Thus, if the I R constraint is binding in any
subinterval, this is always in the lower part, for some interval [fl, Bl] - either>' (B) crosses>' (B)
once or not at all.
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and finally
t* (e 1 ,) = U (q (e, ,) , e, ,) - UO* (e, ,) ,
UO* (e, ,) = Ul ({t, ,) + i() U() (q (S, ,), S, ,) ds,
~l'u, (q (s, -y), s, -y) ds.
(4.34)
(4.35)
This is proved in Stole (1995).
4.4 Implementation
The outlay function is the upper envelope of a family of indifference curves
u (q, e, ,) - t = UO(e, ,). Since q* (e, ,) is strictly increasing in e, there exists an
inverse function e: (q, ,).59
Using (4.34) we can define the outlay schedule T (q*, ,) by
T (q* (e, ,) , e, ,) = t* (e*, ,) = U (q, B", ,) - UO (e*, ,) , (4.36)
and the slope of the outlay schedule T(q*, ,) is given by
dT 0) arr (*)dq = uq + (u() - U() aq = uq q, e " 2: O,
which is positive ((U() = U3) by the envelope theorem).
The curvature of T(q*, ,) is given by
(4.37)
Uqq(·) is negative and the last term is positive, and T (q*, ,) is concave if
aq* > uq() (q, e* (q, ,) , ,) > O
ae - -Uqq (q, e* (q, ,) , ,) - .
(4.39)
Hence, concavity of the outlay schedule imply a stronger restriction than
monotonicity with respect to q* (B, , ).
When the participation constraint is not binding, substituting aq / aB into
(4.39), reorganizing and evaluating the condition for q*(B,,) = q(B,,) yields
(-uqq)(Uq - c)H' + U()qqUqq - uq()U()qq > O
(uqq - H U()qq)Uqq - , (4.40)
59An early paper on implementation is Laffont and Tirole (1986)
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and the outlay schedule is certainly concave for q E [q*(Ol, ')'), q*(O, ')')] .
When the participation constraint binds we have to evaluate the condition for
åij/åO. Rewriting condition (4.39) for q*(O,')') = ij(O,')') yields
(4.41)
The left-hand side in (4.41) is the second order derivative of the outside option
(the first best utility) with respect to O. This is assumed to be positive. The right-
hand side is to be evaluated under a quantity distortion, i.e., ij(O, ')') ::; q(O, ')'),
but at a more favorable location, i.e., ')' ::; (1 - ')'), (for')' ::; 1/2). Hence, it
is ambiguous whether the condition is met or not. At "t = 1/2, the left-hand
side equals the right-hand side. If we are able to show that the right-hand side
increases when ')' decreases, we can conclude that (4.41) imply a contradiction.
Thus, we differentiate the right-hand side at ')' = 1/2 and evaluate the sign of
this (the negative of the sign since d')' < O)
_ _f_ {[Uqo(ij(O,')'),o,')')]2 + C(O ) ° )}
å')' -Uqq(ij(O, -y), 0, ')') Uoo q ,')', ,')' .
Hence, if (4.42) is positive the outlay schedule T(q*,,) is convex, i.e., if
(4.42)
{
2UqO ( UqqO ( - ~) +uqØ-y) _ (U (_ ~) + U ) (~) 2 }
Uqq qqq d"l qQ"l Uqq
(4.43)
- { Uooq ( - ~) + UOO"l} 2: O.
We can now formulate the following
Proposition 4.1 If (4.43) is met, the outlay schedule T(q*, ')') defined by (4.36)
is strictly convex for any ° in the interval [.e, Ol) and consequently for any q in the
interval [q*(.e, ')') , q* (Ol, ')')) and strictly concave elsewhere, for q(0, ')') > q(Ol, ,).
Otherwise, T (q*, ')') is concave everywhere.
Proposition 4.1 is proved by the preceding discussion. The sign of the expression
in (4.43) is hard to evaluate using a general utility function. In the case with
quadratic utility, u = 0(1 - ,)q - ~q2, (4.43) reduces to 2(1 -,) > O. With a
logarithmic utility function, u = 0(1 - ')') lnq, (4.43) reduces to 1/0> O. Hence,
for this two important cases, the outlay schedule is convex in the lower part.
Next, we turn to the problem of how to implement the outlay schedule. In-
stead of announcing the complete set of take-it-or-leave-it contracts, or announc-
ing the fully nonlinear tariff T(q* , ')'), the firm try to implement it via a menu of
optional tariffs. These are described by the following Lemma
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Lemma 4.4 If the outlay schedule T(q*,1) is to be implemented by a menu of
tariffs defined by TA (q, O,1), these tariffs must meet the following conditions
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
TA (q (O, 1) , O, 1) = T (q*,1) = t* (O, 1) ,
TA (q, O, 1) '2 T (q*, 1) ,
TA (q, O, 1) '2 O, 'i/q '2 O.
(4.44)
The conditions in Lemma 4.4 follow from the individual rationality constraint and
the incentive compatibility constraints. With these characteristics, the outlay
function is the lower envelope of the family of tariffs TA (q, O, 1). Implementation
requires that type O (with brand preference 1) finds it optimal to consume an
amount q* (0,1), and that he pays an amount t* (0,1) for this consumption.
When a consumer of type O announces a type parameter O', it is equivalent to
selecting a tariff TA (q, O', 1) and purchasing a quantity q (O', 1). Expected utility
is u (q (O', 1) , O, 1) - t (O' , 1), and by construction of t (O, 1) this is maximized
when O' = O.
lf T(q*, 1) is everywhere concave, we know that it can be represented by the
lower envelope of its tangents. Hence, a menu of two-part tariffs will meet the
incentive compatibility constraint and, of course, by construction, the individual
rationality constraint. The following definition characterizes a menu of two-part
tariffs.
Definition 4.3 A menu of two-part tariffs (subscript 2P) is described by
T2P (q, O, 1) - u (q, 0*,1) - UO (0*,1) + uq (q, 0*, 1) (q - q* (0,1)),
- t* (0,1) + uq (q*, 0,1) [q - q* (O, 1)]. (4.45)
lf T(q*, 1) is concave the menu of two-part given by definition 4.3 meet the
requirements in Lemma 4.4. However, if T(q*, 1) is convex, or has convex parts, a
two-part tariff that is the tangent to T (q* , 1) at a point (q* (O, 1) , t (O, 1)) would
intersect T (q*, 1) at one or more points and, hence, it would violate part (ii) of
Lemma 4.4. Alternatives to pooling tariffs, i.e., tariffs such that different quantity
types are confronted with the same tariff, have to involve a more complicated
scheme. The following definition characterizes a menu of three-part tariffs.P"
60A three-part tariff can be considered as a moderated version of a "knife-edge"mechanism.
In the absence of any uncertainty in demand, the allocation can always be implemented by a
"knife-edge"mechanism, where a consumer pays t ((),"y) if he announces ()and consumes q ((), "y),
otherwise he has to pay 00. But, with even very small demand disturbances present such a
mechanism is not implementable. Picard (1987) shows that a menu of quadratic tariffs might
implement the optimal solution in a situation where a menu of linear tariffs cannot. See also
Laffont and Tirole (1993) pp. 107-109for a reference to Picard in the case of quadratic transfer
schemes in a regulation model. However, quadratic tariffs seem difficult to commercialize, and
will therefore be of little interest in this context. Three-part tariffs on the other hand are a
fairly good approximation to quadratic tariffs and are sufficiently simple to be understood by
the market as well.
73
Definition 4.4 A menu of three-part tariffs (subscript 3P) is described by
if q 5: q* (e, ,) ,
(4.46)
otherwise.
Although T3P (q, e, ,) is not differentiable at q = q*, it is continuous and both
the right side and left side limits are unique and equal to t* (e, ,). The menu
described by 4.4 meets the requirements in Lemma 4.4 given that uq(ij, e,,) is
sufficiently large to satisfy part (ii) in Lemma 4.4. If not, we can substitute any
schedule of marginal prices in the menu three-part tariffs that is decreasing in
type.
A three-part includes in the fixed payment t*(e,,) some "free" consumption
allowance q*(e, ,), subsequent purchases are charged according to a unit price
uq (ij, o, , ).
Finally, the following Proposition characterizes the solution in a (possibly)
mixed tariff regime.
Proposition 4.2 (i) If the outlay schedule has a convex part in the lower quan-
tity end, it can be implemented by a mixed tariff regime with a menu of three-parts
and two-part tariffs. A mixed tariff regime is characterized by the following solu-
tion
(4.47)
e2 is the minimal solution to {e : T2P(q, e, ,) = t* (e, ,) }, which is given by
{e : T2P(q* (fl, ,) , e, ,) = t* (fl, ,)}. (ii) Otherwise, the outlay schedule is concave
everywhere and can be implemented by a menu of two-part tariffs, T* (q, e, ,) =
T2P(q, e, -y), ve.
Proposition 4.2 is proved by the preceding discussion and by applying Lemma
4.4.
4.5 A numerical example with quadratic utility
Let us consider a numerical example with linear transportation costs and quadratic
demand. For reasons of comparison, the assumptions are identical to those used
in Stole (1995). The quantity parameter e is distributed uniformlyon the in-
terval [1,2].. Each firm's marginal cost is equal to zero. Utility is specified by
the function u(q,e,,) = e(1 - ,)q - ~q2. The value of an outside option is
Ul(e, 1-,) = ~e2,2, when we normalize this to be zero for the very lowest type
we get Ul (e, 1-,) = ~,2(e2 - 1). The utility function is linear in quantity type
and localization and the reservation utility is convex in e and ,.
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Figure 4.1: The quantity schedule is implementable but not with two-part tariffs
Figure 4.1 represents the solution with respect to q, p, ,\ and f-t. The quantity
schedule (the bold upper envelope) in figure 4.1 is the solution to the problem
with direct revelation mechanisms. This is continuous and nondecreasing, and
therefore truthfully implementable. In a monopoly context, the dual problem is
to implement the allocation by offering the consumers to choose a tariff from a
menu of two-part tariffs. But as we see in figure 4.1, this is not implementable
since the outlay schedule is not everywhere a concave function.
The graphics in figure 4.2 illustrate the allocation in the (t, q) space and
what implementation of T (q* ,1) looks like in the numerical example described
above, for 1= .4. The fully nonlinear bold line represents T (q*, .4), the solid
lines are some selected three-part and two-part tariffs, the dotted lines are con-
sumers' indifference curves in the (t, q) space. The three-part tariff T3P (q,~, 1)
will truthfully implement q (~, 1), hence it is tangent to the indifference curve
U(~,1) = t - U(q,fl,1) at the point q = q(fl,1). Similarly, a two-part tar-
iff T2P (q, ()2, 1) will truthfully implement q (()2, 1) because it is tangent to the
indifference curve U (()2' 1) = t - u (q, ()2, 1) at q = q (()2' 1).
Empirical observations do support the theoretical results. The examples
drawn in figure 4.3 seem to represent a trend for tariff arrangements in com-
petitive markets.F' The first graphic shows examples on tariffs in the US long
distance fixed telephony market, represented by some of AT&T's tariff offerings
in the residential market, AT&T Basic and AT&T Savings.P The latter graphic
shows examples on tariffs effective in the Norwegian cellular market, represented
61The figures are based on assumptions about daytime-, evening-time and weekend-time
usage, as well as usage patterns with respect to distance bands, and are illustrations rather
than precise tariff computations.
62See also Michell and Vogelsang (1991) and Wilson (1993) for a survey of the practice on
telecommunications pricing during the seventies and eighties.
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o q(fl.) q(fh) 0.5 q1
Figure 4.2: Utility, outlay, three-part and two-part tariffs, 'Y = .4
by the tariffs of Telenor Mobil.
The idea of using a combination of three-part and two-part tariffs seems more
appealing when the outlay schedule is convex for low quantities. Three-part tariffs
are communicated to the market as discounts conditional on a minimum usage
level and such an idea would be hard to introduce towards high quantity users.
Telenor Call minutes AT€4T Call minutes
Figure 4.3: Pricing of telecom services, AT&T and Telenor Mobil
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4.6 Concluding remarks
Linear contracts, as two-part tariffs, are attractive because under many conditions
they implement the optimal contracts in an easy way. However, the paper shows
that the problem is not as straightforward in a duopoly as it is in a monopoly
setting. In a monopoly model, the monotone hazard rate condition is sufficient
for the payment function to be concave, and hence for a menu of two-part tariffs
to implement the outlay function. Although the monotone hazard rate condition
is still a necessary condition in our duopoly model, it is shown that under rea-
sonable assumptions two-part tariffs are outruled for low quantity purchases. In
a monopoly the firm will balance the magnitude of downward quantity distor-
tions below the first best level in order to reduce the information rent to better
types (and all consumer surplus net of the transfer to the firm is informational
rent). In the duopoly, however, the existence of an outside option places a re-
striction on consumers' net surplus. This will in turn change the magnitude of
downward quantity distortions. This produces a convexity in the outlay schedule
when the individual rationality constraint is binding and prevent the firm from
using two-part tariffs for small purchases.
By analyzing the pricing strategies of the firms, one could draw conclusions
about the competitiveness in the market. If the firms to a large extent are using
three-part tariffs, this indicates that the market is more competitive. Although
one should be careful in making comparisons of different markets, the US long
distance market seems to be more competitive than the Norwegian cellular mar-
ket.
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Chapter 5
Two-part Tariffs, Consumer
Heterogeneity, and Cournot
Competition
by Sissel Jensen and Lars Sørgard*
5.1 Introduction
Nonlinear prices are common in many industries, and have been studied ex-
tensively in the economic literature. However, most theoretical studies use a
monopoly setting. In contrast, we observe nonlinear prices not only in monopoly
markets, but also in other market settings such as oligopoly. The purpose of this
article is to help bridging this gap. We analyze two-part tariffs in a Cournot-like
setting by extending the seminal model of Harrison and Kline (2001).
Nonlinear pricing may not be sustainable in oligopoly. For example, Mandy
(1992) finds that in a traditional Bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous products
- where we allow the firms to set nonlinear prices - all prices may collapse to a
uniform price. The finding illustrates that, except for some special cases which
he explores, some of the assumptions in the traditional Bertrand model have to
be relaxed in order to make nonlinear prices sustainable in oligopoly. This has
been done in the emerging literature on nonlinear prices. One extension of the
traditional Bertrand model is to introduce product differentiation, see Calem and
Spulber (1984), Castelli and Leporelli (1993), Economides and Wildman (1995),
*We are grateful for comments from Petter Osmundsen. We are also indebted to partici-
pants at the Nordic Workshop on leT-related research at Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration in June 2001, and to participants at the doctoral seminar series at the
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration for helpful comments.
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Shmanske (1991), and Young (1991). Another extension is to introduce capacity
constraints, as is done in Harrison and Kline (2001), Oren et al. (1983), Scotchmer
(1985a, 1985b) and Wilson (1993). Scotchmer (1985a, 1985b) only considers
existence when the number of firms becomes large, while both Oren et al. (1983)
and Wilson (1993) assume that the firms predict the market shares of their rivals.
In contrast, Harrison and Kline (2001) model quantity as a strategic variable and
consider the strategic interaction between a small (or a large) number of firms.
In Harrison and Kline (2001) each firm commits to a certain quantity, as is
the case in a traditional Cournot model. In addition, each firm sets its fixed fee
while the unit prices are determined endogenously by market forces. The latter
is analogous to what is the case in a traditional Cournot model. In their paper,
Harrison and Kline also provide some examples where we do observe that fixed
fees are less flexible than prices per unit.63 It is found that in equilibrium price
is set equal to marginal costs, and the fixed fee is positive for a given number
of firms. Furthermore, it is found that fixed fees extract the entire consumer
surplus if the number of firms is sufficiently small. Finally, they found that when
the number of firms approaches infinity the fixed fee tends toward zero.
We extend the model introduced in Harrison and Kline (2001) by assuming
two instead of one type of consumers. It turns out that none of the conclusions
referred to above is robust to such an extension of the model. If 'both types
of consumers are served, we find that price per unit is above marginal costs.
Furthermore, fixed fees can be zero or even negative for a finite number of firms.
In fact, firms can be better off committing to traditional Cournot competition
where the firms can only charge a unit price. If the firms can choose whether to
serve one or both types of consumers, they may choose to serve only the large
consumers. Then the equilibrium outcome replicates the one shown in Harrison
and Kline (2001), except there are now some consumers that are not served.
However, by using a numerical example we show that there can be multiple
equilibria. Moreover, it is shown that both firms serving both types of consumers
can be an equilibrium duopoly outcome in cases where the monopolist would
have preferred to serve only one type of consumers. The driving force is that the
rival, non-deviating firm supplies a given quantity which it is committed to sell,
acting as a constraint on the deviating firm's price setting.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate our model, and
report optimal pricing strategies given that all firms serve either both types of
consumers or only one type. In section 3 we explore the equilibrium outcomes of
the model. First, we consider the case with full market coverage, that is, both
firms are restricted to sell to both types of consumers. Second, we consider the
case where each firm chooses either to sell to one or both types of consumers.
630ne example is a consumer club like Costco. The membership fee corresponds to a fixed fee
and the prices of the products a member buys when he visits the store may vary considerably.
For more examples, see Harrison and Kline (2001).
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Finally, in Section 4 we offer some concluding remarks.
5.2 The Model
We consider a setup with k identical firms, k ~ 2, supplying a homogeneous
product. The cost function is characterized by constant returns to scale, C (Q) =
cQ where c > O is the marginal cost and Q is output. For simplicity we omit
fixed costs. The number of firms is exogenous and the question of entry is left
outside the scope of this paper. 64
There are two groups of consumers with a total of N. Consumers with taste
parameter (JI are in proportion A and consumers with taste parameter (J2 are in
proportion (1 - A).65 Preferences are defined by a quasi-linear utility function
V = { u (q, (Jf.) - T if they pay T and consume q units,
O if they do not buy
(Jf.= {(Jl,(J2},
u (q, (J2) ~ u (q, (JI), Vq.
(5.1)
The utility function is assumed to be increasing and strictly concave in q,
u (O,(J) = a, limq-+ouq (q, (J) ~ c, limq-+oou (q, (J) ~ O. For any tariff T = A +
pq, where A is a fixed fee that is paid up-front and p is a unit price, utility
maximization yields a downward sloping demand curve for each individual which
is independent of income and therefore also of the fixed fee. Indirect utility gross
of the fixed fee is
q£(p) - q (p, (Jf.) = maxq u (q, (Jf.) - pq - A,
V (p, (Jf.) = u (qf. (p), (Jf.) - pqf. (p),V;= -qf. (p),
£=1,2.
(5.2)
With quasilinear utility we can measure the indirect utility in monetary terms.
Consumers choose to buy if they obtain a nonnegative net surplus at some firm
i, that is, iff V (Pi, (Jj) - Af. ~ O, i E {I, 2, ... , k} and £ = 1,2. They buy from the
firm providing them with the highest surplus, V (Pi, (Jf.) - Ai ~ V (Pj, (Jf.) - Aj,
(i,j E {I, 2, ... , k}, i #- j, £ = 1,2). When the two consumer types are charged
the same tariff, a type 2 consumer obtains a surplus that is at least as large as the
surplus a type 1 consumer obtains. Thus, if type 1 is able to obtain a nonnegative
surplus, type 2 obtains a strictly positive surplus.
Firms act to maximize profit by choosing a strategy Si = (Qi' Ai), with Qi > O
for all i = 1,2, ., ., k, and we assume that firms are able to commit to this strat-
egy. The firm cannot exclude any consumer from buying. In our model, we use
64SeeHarrison and Kline (2001) on entry in this model.
65Werefer to the first group as type 1 consumers or low demand consumers and to the other
group as type 2 consumers or high demand consumers.
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the assumption that for a given strategy combination there exists a consumer
equilibrium defining a consumer-price profile ((nl"'" nk), (Pl,'" ,Pk)). This is
formally defined in Harrison and Kline (2001). Although we define a firm's strat-
egy in capacity and the fixed fee, from a consumer's point of view he chooses
the quantity that maximizes his utility for a given Ai and Pi. The notion be-
hind this reasoning is that it is a competitive equilibrium where a large number
of consumers without market power trade, given the fixed fees and quantities
from each firm. If all firms leave each consumer with equal and nonnegative
surplus, we assume that all firms serve an equal share of each consumer type,
ni = )..N/k + (1 - )..)N/k.
If there are at least two active firms, the relevant participation constraints in
firm i's optimization problem are given by
V (Pi, Bl) - Ai ~ V (Pj, Bl) - Aj, t = 1,2, j E {l, 2..i - 1, i+ 1, ...k}. (5.3)
Profit for firm i is given by
(5.4)
Since the fixed fee is a lump sum transfer from consumers to the firm, the
unit price in firm i's tariff is adjusted in such a way that aggregate demand for
firm i's product is equal to firm i's supply. Hence, the unit price is independent
of the fixed fee. Whenever the fixed fee is positive, consumers will make all or
nothing purchases at firm i. When firm i serves a total of ni consumers, the unit
price is adjusted to satisfy the following market clearing condition
(5.5)
In line with Harrison and Kline (2001), let us assume that all firms charge the
same fixed fee and the same unit price. Firm i maximizes profit subject to the
condition that the unit prices charged by rival firms are adjusted to satisfy the
market clearing condition and subject to voluntary participation. When every
other firm but i serves both consumer types the unit price P charged byevery
other firm must satisfy the condition
Q-i = (N - ni) [)..ql (p) + (1 -)..) q2 (p)],
o.; = Li;6i o; (5.6)
When rival firms charge their consumers according to the tariff T = A + pq
consumer Bl is indifferent between buying from firm i and one of the other firms
when the participation constraint is binding. If the firm leaves the consumer with
additional surplus, it sacrifices profit. We therefore expect
(5.7)
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Henceforth, superscript 12 denotes that both consumer types are served and
superscript 2 denotes that type 1 (the "small" type) is excluded. Let us first
suppose that both consumer types are served. Then there is at least one addi-
tional active firm where both consumers buy a strictly positive quantity. When
the best alternative option for a type 1 consumer is represented by a tariff T12,
the relevant participation constraint is given by
V (p~2 () ) _ A 12 = V (p12 () ) _ A 12t ,1 t , 1 . (5.8)
Taking rival firms' tariffs as given and maximizing profit with respect to pi2
give the following optimality condition for the unit price in a two-part tariff
(5.9)
Next, firm i must choose the strategy (Qi2, Ai2) in such a way that pi2 satisfies
the market clearing condition. To attract additional consumers from rival firms,
firm i has to adjust the fixed fee. Hence, a marginal increase in market share
affects firm i's profit via the fixed fee. Finding the profit maximizing strategy
reduces to finding the optimal number of consumers to serve.
The effect on the firm's profit of a marginal increase in market share is
arri2 = A 12 _ p12 ql (_1 __ (1_ A) q2 - q1) .
ani E (Q) k - 1 q1
(5.10)
If all firms exclude type 1 and serve type 2 alone, the participation constraint
when the best alternative option for type 2 consumers is represented by a tariff
T2 becomes
(5.11)
The optimal tariff is a cost-plus-fixed-fee tariff and firm i chooses a strategy
(Q~,An in such a way that the market clearing condition is satisfied when p2 = c.
Again, applying symmetry, the effect on the firm's profit of a marginal increase
in market share is
arr~= (1_ A (A 12 __ 1 [cq2 (c) l)
ani ) k - 1 IE (q2 (c)) I . (5.12)
Notice that if firm i takes the number of consumers it serves as given, for
any tariff charged by rival firms the reservation utility is defined as a constant
and will not affect the optimization with respect to unit price. The problem then
resembles the monopoly problem, and the marginal price in our model is identical
to that in a monopoly.
The following two Lemmas state the pricing strategies in a k- firm oligopoly,
given that they either serve both types or exclude type 1.
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Lemma 5.1 (Two consumer types) (i) Let us assume that both consumer
types are served by all firms. Then the pricitu; strategy in two-part tariffs in
a k-firm oligopoly is given by
A~2 = A12 = min {V(p12 B ) ~ (_1__ (1 _ A) q2-ql)}2 TT , l 'c(Q12) k-l ql
12 _ 12 (1 - A)[q2 - ql]
Pi = PTT = C + _ (Aq~+ (1 _ A) q~)
QP = Q~2T= ~ (Aql + (1 - A) q2)
(qe = q£(p~'2:r), q~= q~(P¥T), e = 1,2)
(5.13)
(ii) If both consumer types are served, the pricing strategy in a traditional Cournot
game is given by
A12 = A12 - Oi - UP-
P12= p12 > Ct - UP-
QI2 = QUp = ~ (Aql + (1 - A) q2)
(qe = q£(pUp), q~= q~(pUp), e = 1,2)
(5.14)
where pUp is the (standard) price when both types are served in a Cournot game
with k identical firms charging a uniform price.
Lemma 5.2 (Harrison and Kline) If one of the consumer types is excluded
from purchasing, the pricing strategy in two-part tariffs in a k-firm oligopoly is
given by
A; = A}T = A = min {V(c, Be), (k _ ;~Ic(qe)l}
2 -p2 CPi = TT =
2 Q2 NQi = = kAeqe
Ae = A if e = 1, Ae = (1 - A) if e = 2,
(qe = qe (c), e = 1 or 2)
with B2 2:: Bl type 2 will always be served.
(5.15)
Lemma 5.2 is the result in Harrison and Kline (2001) when the tariffs are
symmetric. Lemma 5.1 is the extension of this to the two-type case, and the
proof is given by the previous calculations. According to Lemma 5.2 the fixed fee
in the single-type case converges toward zero as the number of firms approaches
infinity. Moreover, note that the price per unit is set equal to marginal costs in
the case with one type. As Lemma 1 indicates, these results are reversed when
we extend the model from one to two types.
Harrison and Kline (2001) give a thorough treatment of Cournot competition
with two-part tariffs and a single consumer type, and they also guide the reader
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through all proofs in that case. They show that the pricing described in Lemma
5.2 is a uniqueN ash equilibrium in pricing strategies for the game. All k firms
produce. In addition to the equilibrium with symmetric market, shares there also
exist equilibria that are asymmetric in market shares.
In what follows, we consider first the firms' pricing in a symmetric equilibrium
when all consumers are served. Next, since low demand types may be excluded
we consider the prospects for a unique equilibrium with symmetric pricing in a
duopoly with respect to market coverage.
5.3 Equilibrium outcomes
To illustrate the equilibrium outcomes, we have chosen to focus on a case where
consumer preferences are represented by a quadratic utility function. We let the
reservation utility be zero for both consumers. V = (Jeq- ~q2 - T, .e = 1,2, if they
pay T and consume q units, otherwise they obtain zero utility. Each consumer has
a linear demand function qe = (Je- p, .e = 1,2. Letting (J - A(J1+ (1 - A) (J2 ;:::(J1,
expected demand is Aq1 + (1 - A) q2 = (J - p. The indirect utility exclusive of
the fixed fee for a consumer paying a unit price of p is V (p, (Je) = ~((Je _ p)2,
.e = 1,2. Because we are interested in how equilibrium strategies are affected by
heterogeneity in demand, the example is somewhat simplified by letting (J1= 1
and c = ~.Increased demand side heterogeneity is captured by variations in A and
(J2. Large heterogeneity can then come about either by an increase in the number
of type 2 consumers (A decreases), or because a type 2 consumer has larger
willingness to pay relative to a type 1 consumer ((J2 increases). Hence, increased
demand side heterogeneity is captured by an increase in (J. We use Lemmas 5.1
and 5.2 to characterize the equilibrium in terms of pricing and expected profit
per consumer. All these computations are given in the appendix.
5.3.1 Market coverage
Let us first consider the case where both types are served by all firms/" This
could be due to some institutional restrictions, forcing them to provide a universal
service. Given such a restriction, which combination of fixed fee and price per
unit would each firm choose?
Proposition 5.1 Let us assume that both types of consumers are served and each
firm sets a two-part tariff. If (i) O::; A ::; A* = ::~::::~,or (ii) k > k* - 2(82-;)(1->')'
then A¥T < O and p12 = A + (1 - A)(J2 - ~ - P¥T > c. Otherwise, A}~ > O and
p12 = P¥T > C.
661nthe next section we show that this can be the equilibrium outcome for a large number
of parameter values.
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The critical values A* and k* are derived in the appendix. First, we see that
each firm would set a price per unit that exceeds marginal costs. In contrast,
Harrison and Kline (2001) found that each firm would set a price per unit equal
to marginal costs. Obviously, the extension of the model - from one to two
types of consumers - explains the change in the result. It is well known from a
monopoly model that a firm that serves two types of consumers with one two-part
tariff should let the unit price exceed marginal costs, see Oi (1971). By doing
so it is able to extract more profits from the high demand consumer, and this
outweighs the loss in profit extraction from the low demand consumer as long as
the price-cost margin is not above a certain threshold level. The price-cost margin
is higher the larger the difference between the consumer types (Ol versus (2), and
the larger the proportion of the high demand consumers (A approaches zero).
This is natural, since a large difference between those two groups of consumers
would lead to a relatively high price-cost margin to extract profits from the larger
group.
Second, note that the price-cost margin is not influenced by the number of
firms. At first glance, this may come as a surprise. Why do they not compete
on prices? The reason is that they compete on access prices, not prices per unit.
The prices per unit are set to balance the revenues from the two consumer groups,
after they have competed on fixed fees to attract consumers. Note that our result
is in line with the result in Harrison and Kline (2001), where the price per unit
is always equal to marginal costs since the unit price in both cases just replicates
the monopoly price.
Third, we see that each firm's fixed fee can be set below the fixed cost of
serving a consumer (which is normalized to zero in our setting). In contrast,
Harrison and Kline (2001) found that the fixed fee is always above costs, but
approaches costs when the number of firms approaches infinity. In their setting,
as well as in ours, profits approach zero when the number of firms approaches
infinity. But the fact that we have a positive price-cost margin, implies that
the fixed fee is competed away even for a finite number of firms. In fact, if the
demand side heterogeneity is sufficiently large, the fixed fee is competed away
even in a duopoly.
Obviously, the existence of many firms would lead to fierce competition on
fixed fees. But even with two firms, fixed fees can be negative if the fraction
of the high type consumer is large or when the difference in consumers' type is
large. In such a case the price per unit is high, to extract profits from the "large"
consumer. Then the fixed fee is low even in a monopoly setting, and competed
away in a duopoly setting.
An interpretation of a negative fixed fee in our model is that the fixed fee is
positive, but below costs. This is what we observe in some cases. In Norway for
example, mobile phones have been sold at a price of NOK 1 each, while some
retailers have received a payment of approximately NOK 2000 from the producer.
The producer then incurs a loss of approximately NOK 2000 for each consumer
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it captures, and earns revenues on the same consumer from what he pays for the
use of the mobile phone.P" What is labelled loss leaders in the grocery sector can
be interpreted in a similar way. Grocery stores advertise low prices on certain
products in order to attract consumers to the store, and the consumers end up
buying both the advertised product as well as other products. It has been shown
that the grocery store should then set a price below costs on the advertised
products, and a high price-cost margin on other products (see LaI and Matutes
(1994) ).
In some instances, however, access can be cost free (or close to cost free), for
instance joining some kind of club as the examples referred to in Harrison and
Kline (2001). Hence, an obvious question is whether the firm would have been
better off constraining its tariff policy to uniform pricing. What, then, if the firm
sets a fixed fee equal to zero rather than a negative fixed fee? It can then be
shown that the following would emerge as equilibrium outcomes
Proposition 5.2 Let us assume that both types of consumers are served and each
firm can choose either to set a two-part tariff or a uniform price (fixed fee equal to
zero). Then each firm chooses a uniform price if the fixed fee in a two-part tariff
would be negative (see the previous Proposition), where pfJp < p}2T. Otherwise,
it chooses a two-part tariff with A¥T > O and pfJp > p}~.
First, we see that as long as the fixed fee is above costs in a setting with a
two-part tariff, the firm would set a two-part tariff rather than restrict its pricing
policy to a uniform price. A uniform price, which equals the traditional Cournot
price, would in that case be higher than the unit price in a two-part tariff. This
suggests that a firm would find it profitable to deviate from an outcome where
both firms set a uniform price. It could deviate by setting a lower price per unit,
and extract the gross consumer surplus it generates through a positive fixed fee.
Therefore, we would expect that the firms would end up with a two-part tariff
with a positive fixed fee.
Second, we see that each firm would choose a uniform price if the alternative
is that both firms set a two-part tariff with a negative fixed fee. To understand
this, note that in such a case the price per unit in a two-part tariff is higher than
the traditional Cournot price (a uniform price). In our model, the firms compete
in utility levels. Then if other firms hold a high unit price and generate consumer
surplus via a negative fixed fee, it will be profitable to match other firms' offer by
restricting the fixed fee to zero and lowering the price per unit, thereby increasing
consumer surplus.
Note that competition between the firms leads to a low price per unit: The
equilibrium outcome is a uniform (Cournot) price if that price per unit is lower
67Strictly speaking, the tariff structure is more complicated than the one with a fixed fee and
a price per unit. The user pays a fixed fee in addition to a monthly fixed fee and a price per
unit. Then the fixed fee is followedby a two-part tariff, not a uniform price as in our model.
86
than the price per unit in a two-part tariff, and vice versa. This is illustrated in
Figure 1, where the solid lines show the price per unit in equilibrium.
Unit price
Two-pari tariff
Unit cost
Number of firms
Figure 5.1: Price per unit in equilibrium.
As explained above, in some instances the institutional setting is such that
the firms are forced to set a fixed fee. In other instances, though, firms are
more flexible. If the choice is either to set a negative fixed fee and a relative
high price per unit or a low uniform price, each firm may end up choosing the
latter price system because that would generate a larger sale and thereby a larger
profit. This suggests that there is no conflict between public policy and private
incentives concerning the choice of tariff structure. Each firm has incentive to
choose the tariff structure with the lowest price per unit, which is beneficial for
consumers and leads to only a limited dead weight loss.
5.3.2 Market coverage versus exclusivity
In the previous section, we assumed that each firm served both types of con-
sumers. This may not be the equilibrium outcome. As is well known from
monopoly, in some cases it is beneficial for a firm to exclude the type with low
willingness to pay and in other cases it is preferable to serve both types of con-
sumers. Would the same be true in oligopoly? It turns out to be hard to obtain
closed form solutions when we assess the firm's incentive to deviate from an equi-
librium with symmetric tariffs and market shares. That is, to decide whether the
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case where type 1 is served or excluded, respectively, is a stable equilibrium or
not. We have therefore chosen to present some numerical examples to illustrate
possible equilibrium outcomes.
To simplify, let us consider duopoly. Consider the two equilibrium candidates
in pure strategies where the firms announce identical tariffs and serve the same
customer base. In the first equilibrium candidate, both consumer types are served
with a tariff (A¥T'P}~) and each firm earns a profit per consumer 1T"}~. In the
second equilibrium candidate, low demand consumers are excluded from making
purchases and type 2 is served with a tariff (AfT' c). Each firm earns a profit per
consumer 7rfT. For now we assume that the firms have equal market shares, i.e.,
na = nb = ~N. Expected profit in each of the two possible equilibrium outcomes
is
TI12 N 12TT = "27rTT' (5.16)
and
(5.17)
If demand side heterogeneity is not too large, a duopoly is able to extract all
surplus from type 1 when both consumer types are served. They would generate
the same profit in each of the symmetric cases when TI¥T = TIfT' i.e., if
_ ** _ l 3-482+J(48~-3)(48~-8fh+5)
A = A - 2" + 8(82-1) . (5.18)
Since the duopoly extracts all surplus from type 1 provided that A ;:::: (202 -
02) -1)/(202 -1) (which is smaller than A**), A** is also the monopolist cutoff
value: If A < A** it serves only type 2 consumers, while if A > A** it serves both
types of consumers.
Let us use A** as a reference point for our numerical examples. If A < A** ,
demand side heterogeneity is large and we conjecture that the firms would tend
to exclude type 1. Conversely, we conjecture that each firm would tend to serve
both types of consumers if A > A **. Note, however, that it is not at all obvious
that the cutoff point is the same in duopoly as in monopoly. A monopoly can
exclude type 1 consumers by designing a tariff they would never accept, while
this is not possible in a duopoly. To find the Nash equilibrium, we check for
unilateral deviations from each of those two possible equilibrium candidates, for
different values of A. Then we can compare the equilibrium outcome in duopoly
with the equilibrium outcome in monopoly.
First, let us consider the equilibrium candidate where both firms serve only
type 2 and the firms' tariffs are given by (AfT' c). Type 1 is excluded and the
firms extract the entire surplus from type 2 via the fixed fee, and AfT = V (c, O2).
The two firms split the base of type 2 consumers equally, na = nb = (1 - A)N /2.
Would a unilateral deviation from an outcome where both firms serve only
type 2 be profitable? One firm, say firm a, could deviate by setting a tariff that
type 1 is just willing to accept and capture all type 1 consumers, AN. However,
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since low demand consumers derive nonnegative surplus, high demand consumers
will derive strictly positive surplus by switching to low demand types' tariff. The
deviating firm will then serve a mix of type 1 and type 2 consumers, it will serve
all type 1 consumers and more than half of all type 2. Since firm a captures some
of the high demand types as well, this tends to make such a deviation profitable.
Let the deviating firm choose a strategy (Q}~, A¥T)' or equivalently charge a
tariff (A}~, p}~) in order to maximize profit subject to individual rationality and
firm b's strategy (Q~T' A~T). The problem is to maximize
(5.19)
subject to
V(P¥T' 1) 2:: A}2T,
V (P¥T' (2) - V (P¥T' 1) = V (P~T' (2) - V (c, (2) ,
l¥ (1 - >')q2 2:: fibih,
(5.20)
(5.21)
(5.22)
where iii = qi (P¥T), £ = 1,2, ih = q2 (P~T)' and q2 = q2 (c). Firm b, the non-
deviating firm, will then lose type 2 consumers. This leads to a price reduction
at firm b in order to restore individual rationality, the unit price falls to P~T < c.
Since a unit price reduction in turn leads to an increase in a type 2 consumer's
demand, q2(P~T) > q2(C), the capacity supplied by firm b becomes insufficient to
serve all type 2 consumers, and fib < (1 - >')N /2 is adjusted to restore market
clearing at firm b. Formally, the individual rationality constraint (5.21) and
the market clearing condition (5.22) jointly determine firm b's share of type 2
consumers as a function of firm a's strategy, fib = fib(P2(P¥T)).
Although firm a obtains lower profit per consumer when it deviates, it expands
its market. When >. is low or O2 is high, the market expansion effect is less
likely to cover the per-consumer-loss in profit. In that case there are few type 1
consumers to serve and expected profit per consumer is significantly lower when
firm a deviates. Conversely, we expect that a deviation is profitable when demand
side heterogeneity is low. For>' close to >.** the expected revenue per consumer
is identical and we therefore conjecture that it is profitable to deviate.
In Table 1 we have reported some numerical examples for N = 100 and
c = ~. Hence, P~T = ~ and A~T = V(c, (2). The results in Table 1 confirm
our conjecture. Note that when>. < >.**, the monopolist would serve only type
2 consumers. This particular case therefore suggests that a Nash equilibrium in
a duopoly where both firms serve only one type of consumers to a large extent
coincides with the case where a monopolist prefers to serve only one type of
consumers.
Second, let us consider the equilibrium candidate where both firms serve both
types of consumers, where the firms' tariffs are given by (A}~,p}~) (> (O,c)).
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Table 5.1: Deviation from a symmetric equilibrium where type 1 is excluded.
()2 A ). ** -12 A12 -2 nb nbi [N (1 - A)] II?T II12PTT TT PTT TT
1.2 .2 .467 .618 .073 .374 33.9 .42 9.8 8.9
1.2 .4 .467 .580 .088 .365 25.1 .42 7.4 9.7
1.2 .47 .467 .568 .093 .362 22.1 .42 6.5 10.0
1.2 .8 .467 .522 .114 .351 8.2 .41 2.5 11.5
1.5 .4 .732 .714 .041 .261 24.2 .40 15.0 11.6
1.5 .7 .732 .597 .081 .214 11.7 .39 7.5 11.5
1.5 .74 .732 .583 .087 .209 10.1 .39 6.5 11.6
1.5 .9 .732 .531 .110 .189 3.8 .38 2.5 12.1
2 .4 .883 .927 .003 .156 24.4 .41 33.8 17.8
2 .7 .883 .699 .045 .037 11.5 .38 16.9 13.0
2 .8 .883 .630 .068 .003 7.5 .38 11.3 12.4
2 .9 .883 .564 .095 O 3.7 .37 5.6 12.3
3 .8 .959 .762 .028 O 7.5 .37 31.3 15.0
3 .92 .959 .603 .079 O 2.9 .36 12.5 12.7
3 .97 .959 .593 .107 O 1.1 .36 4.7 12.4
Then type 2 enjoys positive surplus, and type 1 receives his reservation utility.
Again, assume that the firms have equal market shares so that they each serve
N/2. Consider, again, a unilateral deviation by firm a, and keep the strategy for
firm b fixed (Q¥T' A}~).
In this case firm a can deviate by using one of two strategies. Firm a can aim
for all type two consumers N(l - A), but leave them a positive surplus, hence
setting AlT < V(c, ()2). Or, knowing that firm b has a limited capacity, firm a
could act as a monopoly on any residual demand. He will then serve less than
the pool of type 2 consumers N(l - A) but extract all surplus A?T = V(c, ()2).
Consider the first strategy. Firm a announces a tariff (A?T' c) that is strictly
preferred by type 2 consumers. It will extract as much as possible from type 2
consumers via the fixed fee and will maximize
(5.23)
subject to
V (c, ()2) - A?T 2: V (p}~, ()2) - A¥T'
~ (Aq1 + (1 - A) q2) 2: NAill,
(5.24)
(5.25)
where qi = qi (P¥T), or qi = qi (ph2p) if A¥T = O, (f = 1,2), and q1 = q1 (p}~).
The unit price P¥T is adjusted to account for the fact that firm b is now left with
only type 1 consumers instead of a mix of type 1 and type 2. Given that type 1
consumers receive exactly their reservation utility, the unit price that clears the
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market at firm b cannot exceed p}~, (instead, type 1 consumers are rationed at
firm b). Hence, 0.< fi¥T < min{p¥T,piJp}. This restricts the fixed fee in (5.24),
which in turn will restrict the profitability earned on type 2 consumers.
From (5.23) it would seem that a deviation is profitable when A is small.
However, when A is small, V¥T is lowas well in order to restore market clearing
at firm b. Hence, A~T is also low in this case. The more intensely firms compete,
either via a low fixed fee or a low unit price, the more binding is the restriction on
A~T' This suggests that in duopoly an outcome where both firms serve both types
of consumers can be an equilibrium outcome in situations where a monopolist
would have preferred to serve only one type of consumers. In our numerical
example, the second effect always dominates the first and a deviation is never
profitable. In Table 2 we have reported some numerical examples, again using
N = 100, and c = ~,hence p}~ > c, A¥T = V (P¥T' 1).
Table 5.2: Deviation from a symmetric equilibrium (Q¥T' A¥T), the fixed fee in
type 2 's tariff is restricted.
()2 A A** p12 A12 -2 A~T V(C,()2) -12 II12 II~TTT TT PTT PTT TT
1.2 .2 .467 .66 .058 .5 -.417 .245 O 6.9 -33.4
1.2 .4 .467 .62 .072 .5 -.023 .245 .38 6.6 -1.4
1.2 .47 .467 .61 .078 .5 .055 .245 .47 6.5 2.9
1.2 .8 .467 .54 .106 .5 .133 .245 .54 6.3 2.7
1.5 .4 .732 .8 .020 .5 -.183 .5 .38 7.1 -11.0
1.5 .7 .732 .65 .061 .5 .194 .5 .64 6.8 5.8
1.5 .74 .732 .63 .069 .5 .190 .5 .63 6.7 4.9
1.5 .9 .732 .55 .101 .5 .150 .5 .55 6.3 1.5
2 .7 .883 .8 .020 .5 .154 1.125 .64 7.1 4.6
2 .8 .883 .7 .045 .5 .309 1.125 .69 7.3 6.2
2 .9 .883 .60 .080 .5 .225 1.125 .60 6.5 2.3
3 .8 .959 .9 .005 .5 .301 3.125 .69 9.0 6.0
3 .92 .959 .66 .058 .5 .445 3.125 .66 6.9 3.6
3 .97 .959 .56 .097 .5 .245 3.125 .56 6.3 0.7
The other possible deviation strategy in this situation was for firm a to act
as a monopoly on any residual demand from type 2. This time, consider a
deviation where firm a announces a tariff that extracts all surplus from type 2,
(V (c, (}2) ,c). Type 2 enjoys positive surplus by switching to firm b's tariff. Hence,
type 2 consumers will crowd out type 1 consumers at firm b since capacity at firm
1 is insufficient to meet all demand. Firm a earns monopoly profit on each type
2 consumer it serves and aggregate profit is given by
- 2 12 - (5.26)lITT IlITT = [N (1 - A) - nb] V (c, (}2) ,
where fib is the number of type 2 consumers that can be served by firm b. Type 2
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is indifferent between the two firms' tariffs when he receives zero surplus. Hence,
the unit price in firm b's tariff must be adjusted in order to restore individual
rationality for type 2, P}T
V (P~T' (2) - A~~ ~ O,
~ (Aql + (1 - A) q2) ~ nb(}2,
N (1 - A) ~ nb.
(5.27)
(5.28)
(5.29)
This time, firm b is left with type 2 consumers only, instead of with a mix of
type 1 and type 2. Again, we would have thought it is profitable to deviate when
A is small. But now, when A is small, the fixed fee A}~ is low. And therefore,
type 2 consumers will gain considerably if they switch to firm b. Hence, the unit
price P}T is high and demand from type 2 is restricted. This means that iifT is
low and that nb is large in order to restore market clearing.
In Table 3 we report some numerical examples, still using N = 100 and c = ~.
As shown, we find no examples where such a deviation is profitable. Again, the
fact that the non-deviating firm has committed itself to sell a certain quantity
acts as a constraint on the deviating firm's behavior. If there are few type 2
consumers, the non-deviating firm would serve them all and the deviating firm
would have no residual demand. If there are many type 2 consumers, the price
per unit would be close to marginal costs. If so, there is a limited scope for the
deviating firm to generate additional consumer surplus from type 2 by setting
price per unit equal to marginal costs.
92
Table 5.3: Deviation from a symmetric equilibrium (Q}2T,A¥T), acting as a
monopoly on the residual demand from type 2:
()2 A A ** p12 A12 -2 A}T fib N(1-A) I112 I1}TTT TT PTT TT
1.005 .02 .196 .505 .123 .510 .128 50 98 6.25 6.1
1.05 .17 .168 .542 .105 .592 .151 55 83 6.29 4.3
1.1 .3 .292 .570 .093 .670 .180 58 70 6.37 2.1
1.2 .2 .467 .660 .058 .860 .245 74 80 6.89 1.6
1.2 .4 .467 .620 .072 .820 .245 60 60 6.61 O
1.2 .47 .467 .606 .078 .806 .245 53 53 6.53 O
1.2 .8 .467 .540 .106 .740 .245 20 20 6.29 O
1.5 .4 .732 .800 .020 1.3 .500 60 60 8.5 O
1.5 .7 .732 .650 .061 1.15 .500 30 30 6.81 O
1.5 .74 .732 .630 .069 1.13 .500 26 26 6.67 O
1.5 .9 .732 .550 .101 1.05 .500 10 10 6.31 O
2 .7 .883 .800 .020 1.80 1.125 30 30 8.5 O
2 .8 .883 .700 .045 1.70 1.125 20 20 7.25 O
2 .9 .883 .600 .080 1.60 1.125 10 10 6.5 O
3 .8 .959 .900 .005 2.90 3.125 20 20 10.25 O
3 .92 .959 .660 .058 2.66 3.125 8 8 6.89 O
3 .97 .959 .560 .097 2.56 3.125 3 3 6.34 O
5.4 Concluding remarks
Harrison and Kline (2001) have shown how we can extend the traditional Cournot
model to a setting with not only a unit price, but also a fixed fee. They found
that each firm sets a price per unit equal to marginal costs, and a positive fixed
fee that approaches zero when the number of firms becomes large. Thus, we
extend their model from one to two types of consumers. It turns out that the
conclusions in Harrison and Kline (2001) are not robust to such an extension. Let
us assume that both types are served. We then find that price per unit exceeds
marginal costs and the fixed fee can be negative. If the firms can choose between
a traditional Cournot pricing (a uniform price) and a two-part tariff, they may
choose a uniform price.
We have also explored the case where the firms can choose whether to serve
both types of consumers or only one type. It turns out that this case is difficult to
solve analytically. We have therefore chosen to illustrate the possible equilibrium
outcomes with numerical examples. The examples suggest that there might be
multiple Nash equilibria. First, both firms serving only one type of consumers can
be an equilibrium outcome. The numerical examples suggest that this equilibrium
outcome to a large extent coincides with the cases where the monopolist chooses
to serve only one type of consumers. Second, we find that both firms serving
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both types of consumers can be an equilibrium outcome for a large number of
parameter values. In fact, we find no examples where the firms would deviate
from such an outcome. The intuition is that the rival, non-deviating firm's given
quantity acts as a constraint on the deviating firm's behavior. Although this is
just a numerical example, it illustrates that there are instances where a duopoly
serves both types of consumers while the monopoly would prefer to serve only
one type.
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Appendix
Calculation of pricing and profit
In the following we derive the firms' pricing in the case when they announce
identical tariffs, as given in Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2. Superscript 12 is used
when both types are served (superscript 2 when type l is excluded) and k is an
argument used to describe the number of active firms.
A.l Both consumers are served
Pricing is given by Lemma 5.1. With two active firms we have
{
~ (3 - 219)2 l s_ø < ~ (v'2 + 1)
A12 (2) = ~- ø ~ (v'2 + 1) s_ ø < ~
O ø>~- 4
12 { ø - l 1< ø < ~
p (2) = ~(Ø ~ 1) ø ~ ~ 4
{
~+~(ø-1)2 1s_ø<~(v'2+1)
7r
12 (2) = ~(~- Ø) ~ (v'2 + l) s_ ø < ~
.L (219 - 1)2 ø > ~
18 - 4
With three active firms we have
(5.30)
(5.31)
(5.32)
(5.33)
(5.34)
2 { ~ - lø l s_ø < i
7r
1
(3) = :~(20 _ 1)2 ø '2 i
With more than three firms we have
(5.35)
3 < k < 2(/-1)
k '2 2«(}~1)
(5.36)
3 < k < 2«(}~1)
k '2 2«(}~1)
(5.37)
95
3 - 28
4 (k - 1)
k (28 - If
4(k+l)2
3 < k < 2(B~1)
(5.38)
In Proposition 5.1 the critical value ,\* solves the inequality % - ,\ - (1 - ,\ )82 ::; O
from (5.30). k* solves the inequality 1-2k(~~k~~t)B2-1) ::; O from (5.36).
A.2 Only type 2 is served
Pricing is given by Lemma 5.2. The unit price is always equal to marginal price,
p2(2) = p2(3) = c, and the firms' profit per consumer is whatever they manage
to capture via the fixed fee A2(k). With less than 3 active firms we have
A2 (2) = 7r2 (2) = A2 (3) = 7r2 (3) = k (282 - 1)2 (5.39)
With more than 3 firms we have
A2 (k) = 7r2 (k) = (282 - 1)2
4(k-l)
(5.40)
A.3 Uniform Cournot price
When both types are served in a k-firm oligopoly and all firms charge a uniform
price, we have
12 () 28 + k
PUP k = 2(k+ 1) (5.41)
and
(5.42)
Proposition 5.2 can be verified by comparing the firms' profit in the two relevant
cases. When A¥r is negative 7r12(k) (from (5.37)) is equal to or greater than
7rtJp(k) (from (5.42)).
The monopolist's cut-off rate ,\** solves the equality 7r12(2) = 7r2(2) in (5.32) and
(5.39) respectively, given that the duopoly extracts all surplus from type 1 when
both types are served.
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